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EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,630: A PRESIDENT'S 
MANIPULATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S JUST 
COMPENSATION CLAUSE TO ACHIEVE CONTROL 
OVER EXECUTIVE AGENCY REGULATORY 
DECISIONMAKING 
Robin E. Folsom* 
In a highly technological society such as ours, it is inconceivable to 
think of lessening regulatory burdens at a time when private industry 
has the power to alter our genes, invade our privacy, and destroy our 
environment. Only the government has the power to create and enforce 
social regulations that protect citizens from the awesome consequences 
of technology run amuck. l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of President Ronald Reagan's most important political agen-
das was the elimination of the burdens that environmental and other 
social regulations2 place on American businesses. 3 He did this by 
attempting to paralyze the very agencies responsible for imple-
menting social regulations. 4 By immobilizing agencies such as the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), President 
Reagan attempted to stop the promUlgation of new regulations and 
prevent enforcement of existing ones. 5 In his first term, he set in 
motion a program explicitly designed to stop the EPA and other 
• Executive Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA-THE RUSH TO DERE-
GULATE 5 (1983). 
2 The term social regulation refers to policies related to the environment, consumer protec-
tion, worker safety, and equal opportunity. See RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, 
THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE-TALE OF Two AGENCIES 6 (1989). 
3 See id. at 8. 
4 See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text. 
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agencies in their tracks. 6 When Congress and the courts thwarted 
his plan, Mr. Reagan launched a more subtle attack on federal reg-
ulations. 7 Part of this attack was to use the Fifth Amendment's Just 
Compensation Clauses to prevent federal agencies from regulating 
in ways that restrict the use of private property. President Reagan 
did this by petitioning the United States Supreme Court to expand 
the definition of a regulatory taking9 and finally, in his waning days, 
by issuing Executive Order 12,630, designed to chill agency actions 
that burden private property owners. 10 
Throughout his tenure, President Reagan took a series of actions 
designed to exercise an unprecedented degree of control over the 
executive agencies that were carrying out Congress's mandates. ll 
The early phase of Mr. Reagan's scheme can be traced through his 
political appointments; the power he delegated to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) through Executive Order 12,291 to 
review, delay, and even block proposed actions through a cost-benefit 
analysis;12 and the creation of his Task Force on Regulatory Relief 
to do the same for existing regulations. 13 The later and more subtle 
phase of President Reagan's program culminated in the 1988 issuance 
of Executive Order 12,630, entitled Governmental Actions and In-
terference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights (Takings 
Order). 14 
The Takings Order, which purports to address fiscal responsibility, 
requires executive agencies and departments (agencies) to review 
6 See infra notes 59-147 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 148-300 and accompanying text. 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[Njor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." I d. 
9 See infra notes 151-63 and accompanying text. 
10 Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988). 
11 See Oliver A. Houck, Presidential Oversight Of Regulatory Decisionmaking: President 
X And The New (Approved) Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 536 (1987). President 
Reagan was not the first president to try to control federal agencies, but his was the most 
comprehensive and intrusive attempt. See Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rule-
making: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1061 (1986). 
Centralized control over the agencies began with President Nixon's Quality of Life Review, 
was followed by President Ford's requirement that agencies consider the inflationary impact 
of major rulemaking proposals, and continued with President Carter's establishment of the 
Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG), requiring a detailed regulatory analysis of every 
"major" rule before it was issued. See id. The programs initiated by Presidents Nixon, Ford, 
and Carter are referred to as quality checks, rather than outright manipulation of executive 
agencies. See HARRIS, supra note 2. 
12 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982). 
13 See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. 
14 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10. 
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all of their proposed actions that might reduce the use or value of 
private property to determine whether those actions have takings 
implications. 15 An action with takings implications is one that, if 
reviewed under criteria provided by the Takings Order, fits the 
Order's description of a Fifth Amendment taking.16 The Takings 
Order restricts, and sometimes eliminates completely, an agency's 
ability to implement actions that have takings implications. 17 
The Takings Order came on the heels of two Supreme Court cases 
that expanded, somewhat, the definition of a regulatory taking.18 A 
regulatory taking is a government regulation that restricts the use 
of private property so much that the government has effectively 
appropriated the property from its owner.19 In the Takings Order, 
President Reagan purported to be concerned about the effect that 
an expanded definition of a regulatory taking would have on the 
public purse. 20 The broader the definition of a regulatory taking, the 
more governmental actions it will encompass. 21 This will result in an 
increase in the number of successful takings claims brought against 
the government and more government expense to compensate those 
claims. 22 
President Reagan falsely premised the Takings Order on concern 
for the public fisc. 23 First, very few of the many takings claims 
brought against the federal government are successful. 24 Of those 
claims that are successful, most are the more conventional claims of 
physical appropriation of private property, rather than claims of 
regulatory taking of private property.25 While the Takings Order 
addresses governmental appropriation or occupation of private prop-
erty,26 the bulk of the Order addresses regulatory actions. 27 Second, 
15 Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated 
Takings, (unpublished) (issued June 30, 1988) at § Il(A). For a more complete definition of 
takings implications, see infra notes 192-264 and accompanying text. 
16 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 2. 
17 See id. at § 4. 
18 The two cases are: First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) and NoHan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987). 
19 See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). 
20 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § l(b) & (c). 
21 See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 475-556 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 286-89 and accompanying text. 
25 Id. 
26 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 3(b). 
27 See generally id. at §§ 3 & 4. 
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in reality the definition of a regulatory taking, as it was articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in 1988, was not as expansive 
as the Takings Order professes and did not encompass the vast 
quantity of regulatory actions which President Reagan warned of. 28 
Therefore, the risk was low that an increasing number of govern-
ment actions would be deemed to be compensable takings. 29 
This Comment will explain how President Reagan manipulated 
then-current takings jurisprudence, in order to restrain agency ac-
tions through the Takings Order, by significantly overstating the 
threat that takings law posed to the public fisc. By fictionalizing the 
threat that the Fifth Amendment poses to the public purse, Presi-
dent Reagan created an entire category of regulations deemed to 
have takings implications that would never be held to constitute a 
taking by a court of law. 30 By doing this, President Reagan could 
assign a cost to those regulations with takings implications. 31 That 
cost can then be factored into the cost-benefit analysis that must be 
performed on the regulation, pursuant to Executive Order 12,291. 32 
Executive Order 12,291 prohibits agencies from implementing reg-
ulations if the regulations' costs outweigh their benefits to society. 33 
By adding to the cost-side of the cost-benefit analysis, the Takings 
Order amounts to nothing more than a President's attempt to control 
executive agency decisionmaking by claiming that certain regula-
tions are simply too costly to implement. 34 
Section II of this Comment looks at the tools President Reagan 
used to implement his deregulation agenda, beginning with strategic 
political appointments designed to render the regulatory agencies 
inactive, continuing with his centralization of regulatory oversight 
power in the OMB through Executive order 12,291, and ending with 
the Takings Order. An overview of the President's deregulation 
program will help to place the Takings Order in its appropriate 
context. Section III examines the Takings Order itself as well as a 
bill currently before Congress that attempts to codify the Takings 
Order into public law. Section IV reviews the status of takings law 
as it existed in 1988; the law upon which President Reagan purports 
to have based his Takings Order. Section IV examines the present 
2ll See infra notes 475-556 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 475-556 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 475-556 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra note 573 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 573-74 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 557-75 and accompanying text. 
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day changes in takings jurisprudence, relative to the language of the 
Takings Order. Section V argues that the Takings Order was not, 
and is not, supported by the law upon which it is purportedly based. 
Instead, the Takings Order was an attempt to manipulate the Fifth 
Amendment's Just Compensation Clause in an effort to stop execu-
tive agencies from regulating businesses. By assigning an estimated 
cost to all agency actions having takings implications, the cost-side 
of the cost-benefit analysis becomes much greater and thus, may 
prohibit implementation of the actions. This Comment argues that 
Congress should reject Republican legislators' attempts to codify the 
Takings Order because their bill would perpetuate the regulatory 
inactivity program created during the Reagan Administration. Fi-
nally, this Comment argues that the Clinton Administration should 
repeal the Order because it subjects regulatory agencies to unnec-
essary and unfounded regulatory review that can prevent agencies 
from implementing environmental and other social regulations. 
II. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DEREGULATION SCHEME 
Until the late 1960s, governmental interference with private prop-
erty was relatively minimal and companies benefited from the gov-
ernment's hands-off approach.35 Unregulated, a company could dis-
pose of the hazardous by-products of its manufacturing processes by 
dumping those hazardous materials into the air, the ground, or the 
water.36 This is known as externalizing the company's pollution 
costS.37 While it costs the company little or nothing to dispose of its 
wastes in this manner, the costs to the public health and the envi-
ronment are huge.38 With the 1960s and early 1970s, however, came 
a positive governmental commitment to public health and the envi-
ronment featuring many new environmental regulations that re-
stricted the use of private property.39 New environmental laws re-
stricted companies' ability to unload pollution into the environment. 40 
35 ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER et. aI., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 29 (1992). 
36 See id. 
37 See id. When a manufacturer dumps its pollutants into the air or into a passing stream it 
is externalizing the cost of disposing of these pollutants onto its neighbors, through illness or 
polluted air and water, rather than spending the necessary money to install equipment that 
will treat and neutralize the pollutants. See id. 
38 See id. 
39 For an overview of the upsurge of environmental regulations, see generally TOLCHIN, 
supra note 1, at 225-51. 
40 See Douglas M. Garrou, The Potentially Responsible Trustee: Probable Target For CER-
CLA Liability, 77 VA. L. REV. 113, 144 (February, 1991). 
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The new environmental regulations forced companies to internalize 
the costs of disposing of their wastes by using lawful, and often 
expensive, disposal methods. 41 The cost of complying with environ-
mental regulations can have a large impact on a company's net 
profit. 42 
By the mid-1970s, companies were fighting back. Industrial inter-
ests began mounting campaigns against governmental intervention 
in private industry, particularly against environmental regulations. 43 
Industrial lobbyists claimed environmental laws were a major source 
of America's economic deficiencies, because the capital investments 
required by many environmental laws diverted money away from 
industrial productivity and thereby retarded economic growth, re-
sulting in high inflation, double digit interest rates, the exodus of 
manufacturing plants from this country, and thousands of lost jobs. 44 
Leaders of industrial initiatives, such as the western and mountain 
states' Sagebrush Rebellion,45 mounted a major political campaign 
that culminated in the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980. 46 
As promised, the Reagan Administration ushered in a thinly veiled 
campaign of dismantling many of the social regUlations implemented 
during the preceding decade, including environmental regulations. 47 
Ronald Reagan was not the first president to recognize the burden 
that regulations can place on industry.48 Presidents Richard Nixon, 
Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter each sought to reform misdirected 
or arbitrary regulations, however, these presidents did not seek to 
eliminate social regulations, but instead merely sought to streamline 
and make the regulatory system more efficient.49 In sharp contrast, 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 253. One such campaign, the Sagebrush Rebellion, which 
began in the Western and Mountain States, took aim at command-and-control type regulations 
and the relationships between "ultraliberal" environmental lobbyists and their political coun-
terparts at the EPA. See id. 
44 See id. Other factors significantly contributing to the decline of the American market 
include cheap foreign labor costs, the pitfalls of short-term planning, the decline in certain 
markets on a worldwide scale, and outdated technology. 
45 See id. at 253. One leader of the Sagebrush Rebellion, Joseph Coors of Coors Beer in 
Colorado was one of many executives who contributed heavily to the Reagan campaign. It is 
believed he later recommended that President Reagan appoint James Watt as Secretary of 
the Interior to ensure a strong anti-environment posture in the Administration. Mr. Watt was 
the former Director of the anti-environmentalist Mountain States Legal Fund. See Bill Proch-
nau, Environmentalists Say Watt Deceives with "Doublespeak," WASH. POST, June 4, 1981, 
at A17. 
46 See TOLCHlN, supra note 1, at 7. 
47 See id. at 20-22. 
48 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 1l. 
49 See id. President Carter went the furthest of the three. He instituted the Regulatory 
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the Reagan Administration sought to eliminate, rather than reform, 
many environmental regulations and to retard the process by which 
federal agencies promulgate new environmental regulations. 50 
President Reagan's approach to deregulation, particularly regard-
ing environmental laws, was to render the federal agencies inactive 
and thus incapable of fulfilling their congressional mandates. 51 He 
approached this task from two different angles. He began by setting 
forth an unambiguous policy explicitly designed to remove the reg-
ulatory burdens from the backs of American industries. 52 First, he 
appointed agency chiefs who were hostile to the mission of their 
agency53 while simultaneously slashing the budgets of those agen-
cies.54 Second, President Reagan attempted to weaken the influence 
of public interest groups, including groups lobbying Congress as 
advocates of the public interest, while providing industrial interests 
with greater ability to influence governmental decisionmaking.55 And 
third, he exerted tremendous control over agency decision making 
by requiring all agencies to perform cost-benefit analyses on their 
regulatory programs and subjecting the analyses to review and ap-
proval by OMB. 56 
When Congress, the courts, and the American public reacted ad-
versely to his deregulation program, President Reagan changed tack 
and took a more subtle approach to deregulation in his second term 
in office. 57 Instead of openly controlling the federal agencies policies, 
President Reagan employed the Fifth Amendment's Just Compen-
sation Clause to retard the government's ability to regulate private 
property uses. 58 
A. Deregulation During President Reagan's First Term 
President Reagan's deregulation program was much more direct 
and explicit in his first term in office than it was in his second term. 59 
Analysis and Review Group (RARG) and charged the group with comparing the costs and 
benefits of various federal programs. [d. Unlike the Reagan Administration's Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief, RARG did not have formal authority over other executive branch agencies. 
See id. 
50 See id. at 7-8. To illustrate this point, President Reagan referred to his program as 
"regulatory relief" rather than regulatory reform. 
51 See id. at 253-58. 
52 See infra notes 65-124 and accompanying text. 
53 See Houck, supra note 11, at 538 n.15. 
54 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 255. 
55 See infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text. 
57 See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. 
58 See infra notes 150-291 and accompanying text. 
59 See infra notes 60-291 and accompanying text. 
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His blatant gestures included strategically chosen political appoint-
ments,60 substantial budget cuts,61 shifts in access to governmental 
ears from public interest lobbyists62 to industrial lobbyists,63 and 
implementation of a regulatory cost-benefit requirement. 64 
1. Attempting Agency Inactivity Through Political Appointments 
and Budget Cuts 
An important part of President Reagan's deregulation scheme was 
to appoint agency chiefs who were hostile to their agencies' mission. 65 
One such appointment was President Reagan's choice for EPA Ad-
ministrator, Ann Gorsuch Burford.66 In Ann Burford, President Rea-
gan found an appointee with a track record that was generally anti-
environmentalist, pro-business, and hostile to EPA's objectives. 67 
She believed EPA was enforcing regulations too stringently and that 
this policy undermined the health of the economy.68 In her short 
term in office, Ms. Burford created a far less active EPA that failed 
to enforce many of its own regulations. 69 Under her control, EPA 
became less active for two reasons: Ann Burford created an unpro-
ductive, hostile work environment70 and significantly slashed the 
agency's budget.71 Ms. Burford coupled hostility and animosity to-
ward her staff with a policy that required decisions that were once 
made by EPA regional directors to be channeled, instead, through 
60 See Houck, supra note 11, at 538 n.15. 
61 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 255. 
62 See id. at 8. 
63 See Houck, supra note 11, at 542 n.42. OMB, which oversaw, influenced, and often 
prohibited agency actions became a channel through which industry influenced agency deci-
sionmaking. See infra notes 96-147 and accompanying text. 
64 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 12. 
65 See Houck, supra note 11, at 538 n.15. Professor Houck identifies many of President 
Reagan's initial appointees who, before being appointed, held policies or views that were in 
direct contravention to the policy of the agency or department they would be charged with 
running. He lists Richard Harris, Director of Office of Surface Mining; James Watt, Secretary 
of Interior; Thorne Auchter, Administrator of the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration; Robert Burford, Director of Bureau of Land Management; Ann Gorsuch Burford, 
EPA Administrator and John Crowell, Chief of United States Forest Services. Id. Addition-
ally, agencies that were targets of Mr. Reagan's deregulation program were staffed with 
mediocre appointees. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW ARGUING THE REAGAN REVO-
LUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 230 n.12 (1991). 
66 See TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 100. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 255. 
70 See id. at 254. 
71 See id. at 255. 
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her.72 This program resulted in the regional directors' reluctance to 
develop or implement new programs because of the hostility many 
regional directors felt from Ann Burford. 73 
The second reason EPA became less active under Ann Burford 
was because of significant cuts to the agency's budget.74 At a time 
when EPA desperately needed resources to implement the new 
regulations that resulted from environmental laws passed in the 
1970s,75 Ann Burford, herself, called for a substantial reduction of 
EPA's budget. 76 After only two years, Ms. Burford, together with 
the efforts of Secretary of the Interior James Watt and OMB Direc-
tor David Stockman, reduced EPA's overall budget by $308 million, 
a drop of nearly 23 percent from the Agency's budget in 1980.77 The 
two areas most affected by these cuts were research and enforce-
ment. 78 In Ms. Burford's first year with the Agency, budget cuts in 
EPA's research department totaled $60 million. 79 By targeting the 
research budget, Ms. Burford could weaken the base of knowledge 
upon which the country's environmental policies were to be made.80 
Without sufficient knowledge, or the resources necessary to gain 
that knowledge, EPA cannot effectively implement environmental 
regulations. 81 
In addition to research, budget cuts also affected the area of 
environmental enforcement.82 In 1980, EPA filed forty-three lawsuits 
to clean up hazardous waste sites.83 Nine months into 1982, the 
agency had filed only three similar suits.84 The agency failed to 
72 See id. at 254. 
73 See id. The effects of Ms. Burford's actions were "immediate and significant: fewer rules 
were written, enforcement actions declined, workforce decreased dramatically, morale and 
initiative among staff plummeted, institutional memory was destroyed, and implementation 
of newer, more complex statutes was delayed." See id. at 258. 
74 Lawrence Mosher, Will EPA's Budget Cuts Make it More Efficient or Less Effective? 
NAT'L J., Aug. 15, 1981, at 1466. 
76 See id. 
76 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 255. 
77 EPA's budget dropped from $1.347 million to $1.039 million. See id. 
78 See id. at 258. 
79 See Mosher, supra note 74, at 1466. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 Enforcement efforts were reduced particularly in the areas of toxic substances and air 
pollution. See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 260. EPA's enforcement division suffered from more 
than budget cuts. For instance, Mr. Reagan strategically left some positions unfilled. See 
Houck, supra note 11, at 539 n.13. The EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement position 
remained open for more than a year. See id. 
83 See Panel Finds Past Mismanagement by EPA, New Jersey in Hazardous Waste En-
forcement, 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1612 (Jan. 21, 1983). 
84 See id. 
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enforce other environmental programs, as well. Rather than enforce 
the sulfur dioxide standards required by the Clean Air Act, EPA 
relaxed these standards. 85 
Ann Burford was forced to resign in 1983 when a congressional 
committee investigating EPA's failure to enforce environmental laws 
threatened to charge her with criminal contempt.86 The product of 
her tenure was an EPA that was in a state of disarray and lacked 
the respect it once commanded.87 
2. Reduction of Public Awareness Programs 
President Reagan's second approach to deregulation involved re-
ducing the effectiveness of public interest groups, while simulta-
neously providing industry with greater access to governmental 
ears.88 Public interest groups were instrumental in rallying public 
support for much of the environmental laws passed in the 1970s.89 
The public received word of environmental hazards from public in-
terest groups and from EPA, itself.90 Prior to 1981, EPA was en-
gaged in informing the public about environmental issues.91 The 
public awareness office, staffed by forty people, used television, 
radio, and other methods to inform the public of the need for pollu-
tion control. 92 The Reagan Administration discontinued this function 
by eliminating the public awareness office entirely.93 Additionally, 
President Reagan attempted to reduce the effectiveness of public 
interest lobbying groups by cutting both direct and indirect subsi-
85 See The Relaxations Were Pretty Stupid, NAT'L J., Mar. 13, 1982, at 458. Sulfur dioxide 
is a major contributor to the acid rain problem. The United States Government, by entering 
into the U.S.-Canadian acid rain treaty talks, had committed itself to vigorously promoting 
emission standards related to the reduction of acid rain. [d. Nevertheless, EPA allowed 
thirteen states to raise their sulfur dioxide emissions by more than a million tons per year. 
[d. These reductions compromised the commitment to this treaty by the United States. [d. 
86 See Thomas Riehle & Deborah Galembo, Washington's Movers and Shakers, NAT'L J., 
July 7, 1984, at 1325. See also FRIED, supra note 65, at 135. Ms. Burford claimed executive 
privilege, refusing to disclose the contents of open criminal investigations of environmental 
offenders, claiming that disclosure would interfere with the government's ability to prosecute 
these offenders. See FRIED, supra note 65, at page 229-30 n.9. Her associate in charge of 
toxic-waste-site cleanups, Ms. Rita Lavelle, was jailed for perjury. See id. at 230 n.12. 
87 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 265. 
88 See id. at 8. 
89 See id. at 37. 
90 See Mosher, supra note 74, at 1466. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. In addition to eliminating the public awareness office, the Reagan Administration 
significantly cut the size of EPA's press office staff and severely limited the number of 
publications it produced. [d. 
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dies. 94 For instance, he eliminated the low postal rates for non-profit 
organizations which public interest groups relied upon when fund 
raising. 95 
While attempting to reduce the influence of public interest groups, 
Mr. Reagan simultaneously made the government much more acces-
sible to industrial interests. 96 For instance, it is believed that the 
OMB, which exerts enormous influence over agency actions,97 was 
attentive primarily to industrial interests. 98 Additionally, in his first 
days in office, Mr. Reagan created the Task Force on Regulatory 
Relief,99 headed by Vice-President George Bush.100 The Task Force 
worked together with American industries to determine which reg-
ulations were overly burdensome to those industries and needed to 
be relaxed.101 The Task Force made these determinations by solic-
iting advice from industryl02 and then performing a cost-benefit anal-
ysis on the regulations that industry leaders identified as trouble-
some. 103 Then, in conjunction with the OMB, the Task Force exerted 
tremendous control over the development or enforcement of those 
regulations. 104 The EPA was one of the Task Force's major targets. 105 
94 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 8. President Reagan set in motion a program designed to 
"defund the left." Id. at 125. Although public interest lobbyists lost much of their funding, 
the "defund the left" program did not disable the public interest lobby. See id. 
95 See id. 
96 During President Reagan's tenure, the OMB, the Vice-President's Task Force on Regu-
latory Relief, and the agencies themselves were more accessible to industrial representatives 
than to public interest groups. For instance, when taking action toward implementing gasoline 
lead standards in 1981, EPA held 32 meetings with representatives of the petroleum industry 
and no such meetings with health experts. See Editorial Backroom Deals at EPA, (hereinafter 
Backroom Deals) WASH. POST, May 27, 1982, at A26. 
97 See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. 
98 See TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 77. 
99 Id. The Task Force was given Cabinet-level status and was comprised of the Vice-
President; the Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, and Labor 
Departments; the Director of OMB; the Chairman of the Council on Economic Advisers; and 
the President's Assistant for Policy Planning. See Meyer v. Bush, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 
228, at *2 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 8, 1993). 
100 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 100. 
101 See Margaret E. Kriz, Deferred Costs, NAT'L J., Dec. 12, 1989, at 2965. The petroleum 
industry tried through three presidential administrations to block EPA's attempts to reduce 
lead in gasoline. See Backroom Deals, supra note 96, at A26. It finally found an advocate for 
its cause in the Task Force on Regulatory Relief. See id. Shortly after hearing from the Task 
Force, EPA proposed its plans to relax or rescind lead standards. See id. 
102 See William H. Miller, Task Force Report! 30 More Regulations Join Reagan 'Hit List,' 
INDUSTRY WEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 22. 
103 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 100. 
104 Regulatory Reform, Citizen's Group Accuses Administration of Foot Dragging on 
Health, Safety Rules, (hereinafter Regulatory Reform) Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 198 
(Oct. 13, 1988). 
105 Robert A. Leone, Why Anne Burford Got the Lead Out, 18 WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1986, 
650 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:639 
3. OMB's Cost-Benefit Regulatory Review 
President Reagan's third approach to disabling the agencies was 
to implement a comprehensive policy of regulatory review, one that 
could delay regulations indefinitely by tying them up in bureaucratic 
"red tape."106 His first major review initiative was Executive Order 
12,291, issued on February 17, 1981. 107 The Order requires federal 
agencies108 to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of new and existing 
regulations and to refrain from implementing any new regulatory 
program unless the program's potential benefits to society outweigh 
its potential costs to society.109 Given several alternatives, the 
agency must implement the least costly action. 110 OMB's Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is charged with the 
regulatory oversight of Executive Order 12,291. 111 Under the Ex-
ecutive Order, OMB may intercede at two different points in the 
agency's rulemaking process: before the agency asks for public 
comment112 and before publication of the final rule. 113 After conduct-
ing a cost-benefit assessment, called a Regulatory Impact Analysis 
at 50. When asked to prioritize a deregulation wish list, industries ranked environmental 
regulations, especially hazardous waste management and pollution control regulations, at the 
top. See Kriz, supra note 101, at 2965. 
106 See TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 74. Regulatory review was not a novel concept. See MARC 
L. LANDY et. al., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUES-
TIONS 248 (1990). President Nixon required an economic impact analysis to be prepared for 
all proposed regulations that might have a substantial economic impact. See id. This was 
called the "Quality and Life" review process. See id. President Carter used RARG to study 
the economic impact of government actions. See id. These review groups worked with the 
agencies to determine the most efficient way to achieve the stated purpose of the regulation. 
See id. The Reagan reviews, on the other hand, served to implement an anti-regulation 
ideology. See id. 
107 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 12. 
108 The term "agency" in this Order refers to any agency under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), excluding 
those agencies specified in 44 U.S.C. 3502(10), the so-called "independent" agencies, such as 
the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 12, at § l(d). 
109 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 12, at § 2(b). In January of 1985, President Reagan 
issued Executive Order 12,498 as an "early warning system" requiring agencies to obtain 
OMB approval before undertaking any significant step toward researching or gathering infor-
mation on potential problems needing federal action. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 
(1986) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. III 1985). Some critics claim that this Order was 
designed to prevent agencies from compiling a record that would justify taking action on a 
particular problem. See Morrison, supra note 11, at 1063. Executive Order 12,498 also requires 
agencies to indicate how the proposed action is consistent with the executive's regulatory 
policy. See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 101. 
110 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 12, at § 2(d). 
111 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 252. 
112 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 12, at § 3(c)(2). 
113 See id. 
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(RIA), the agency must submit the RIA to the Director of OMB if 
the action would constitute a "major rule."114 The Order authorizes 
the Director to delay agency action until he or she has reviewed the 
proposed regulation and until the agency incorporates the Director's 
views, together with the agency's response to those views, in the 
agency's rule making file. 115 Executive Order 12,291 grants OMB 
authority to delay and review proposed actions only "to the extent 
permitted by law. "116 For instance, OMB may not delay a proposed 
regulation past a statutorily mandated deadline. 117 
Under President Reagan, the OMB became a vehicle for influenc-
ing and coercing agency actions. lIB Critics charge that the OMB 
frequently teamed up with the Task Force on Regulatory Relief119 
to intimidate the EPA and other agencies into not implementing new 
regulations and not enforcing existing ones. 120 Although OMB has 
no official authority to affect agency action, proposed regulations 
could be dropped into a "black-hole" at OMB and not released until 
the agency in question and OMB reached a compromise. 121 Despite 
114 See id. at § 3. A "major rule" is any regulation that is likely to result in 
(1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; (2) A major increase in 
costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local govern-
ment agencies, or geographic regions; or (3) Significant adverse effect on competition, 
employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-
based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export 
markets. 
[d. at § l(b). Additionally, the Director has the authority, subject to the direction of the Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief, to order any rule to be treated as a major rule. See id. at § 3(b). 
115 See id. at § 3(f)(2). 
116 In a 1981 hearing before a congressional committee, James C. Miller III, then-Admin-
istrator of OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, testified that "[t]he limited 
application of [EO 12,291] is a crucial point, one that insures [its] legality and the legality of 
actions pursuant to [it]." See Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F.Supp. 566, 570 
(D.D.C. 1986). 
117 Exec. Order No. 12,291 supra note 12, at § 8(a)(2). 
118 Regulatory Reform, supra note 104. 
119 The Task Force on Regulatory Relief had supervisory power over OMB's actions under 
Executive Order 12,291. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 12, at § 3(e)(1). The Task 
Force had authority to settle any disputes arising between OMB and the agencies over matters 
relevant to the executive order. See id. 
120 Regulatory Reform, supra note 104. 
121 See TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 74. One OMB official stated 
[d. 
[w]e can recommend but we can't do anything. Technically, OMB has no authority, 
but uses bribery and blackmail instead. The executive order says we can consult, 
but the agency can't do anything while we consult. We can drop it into a black hole 
while the politicians decide what to do with it. It is just window-dressing to a power 
grab. We're not doing heavy analysis. The economic analysis is just window-dressing 
for the executive order. 
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the Order's express limitation on OMB's authority, OMB often de-
layed proposed regulations well past their statutorily mandated 
deadlines. 122 In a three year period, the EPA missed the deadline 
for publishing 86 out of approximately 169 proposed regulations that 
the Agency submitted for OMB review because OMB held these 
regulations past those dates. 123 After the issuance of Executive Or-
der 12,291, there was a significant decrease in the number of regu-
lations issued. 124 
These abuses by OMB created considerable debate about the Pres-
ident's authority to influence executive agency policy making. 125 
Much has been written on the President's authority to influence, or 
even dictate, agency policy making decisions in those instances 
where Congress leaves decisionmaking up to the discretion of the 
agency administrator, or when Congress leaves room for agency 
interpretation of the statute. 126 Because it involves separation of 
powers, the courts have avoided the question of whether the Pres-
ident's general exercise of control over executive agencies through 
Executive Order 12,291 is constitutional. 127 The Supreme Court, 
however, has addressed the issue of agency inaction in the face of 
nondiscretionary congressional mandates, even when the President, 
himself, caused that inaction. 128 In the 1975 case, Natural Resources 
122 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F.Supp. 566, 571 (D.D.C. 1986). The 
average delay for each regulation EPA submitted to OMB in 1986 was 91 days. See id. 
123 See id. 
124 See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 107. Within five months of the issuance of Executive Order 
12,291, the executive branch reported a 50% reduction in proposed rulemaking compared to 
the same time period in 1980. Vice-President George Bush announced that 180 regulations 
had been withdrawn, modified, or delayed. See TOLCHlN, supra note 1, at 70. 
125 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Oversight of Regulatory Agency Decision-
making, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443 (1987); Morrison, supra note 11. 
126 See, e.g., Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 
(1979); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Morrison, supra note 11; McGarity, supra note 
125. 
127 See e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507 (D.C.Cir. 
1986) (court would not decide the legality of OMB's participation in agency rulemaking, which 
presented "difficult constitutional questions concerning the executive's proper role in admin-
istrative proceedings and the appropriate scope of delegated power from Congress to certain 
agencies. "). 
128 See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 43 (1990) (court refused 
to defer to OMB interpretation of statute when statute clearly expressed Congress's intent); 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 
361, 368 (1986) (court should not defer to agency interpretation of statute if interpretation 
alters Congress's clearly expressed intent); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842--43 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter. "). 
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Defense Council v. Train,129 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit set a strict standard for agency 
compliance with nondiscretionary statutory mandates. 13o The Court 
stated that it could provide injunctive relief to a plaintiff seeking 
agency compliance only when the agency official did not "in good 
faith employ[] the utmost diligence in discharging his statutory re-
sponsibilities. "131 Lower courts have construed the term "good faith" 
as qualifying the more critical term, "utmost diligence. "132 In State 
v. Gorsuch,133 the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York examined Ann Gorsuch Burford's failure to 
publish proposed regulations under the Clean Air Act within the 
nondiscretionary timetable set by Congress. 134 The court stated that 
when an administrator fails to perform a nondiscretionary congres-
sional mandate, such as meeting a deadline, the administrator "must 
be able to demonstrate that he is completely unable to fulfill his 
duties .... "135 If the administrator's failure to comply with the 
mandate was due to "competing concerns or other decisions on his 
part," rather than a complete inability to perform the task, the 
administrator did not act in good faith. 136 
In 1986, the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia reviewed another challenge to EPA for failure to meet stat-
utorily mandated deadlines in the case, Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Thomas.137 This time, EPA was unable to meet deadlines 
for promulgating final permitting standards for underground storage 
tanks, pursuant to Congress' Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments of 1984, because OMB had not yet reviewed the standards. 138 
The court recognized that the President must be granted some room 
to control and supervise executive policy making. 139 The President's 
129 510 F.2d 692, 712 (D.C.Cir. 1975). 
130 See id. 
131 [d. at 713. 
132 See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F.Supp. 165, 171 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also State v. 
Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
133 See State v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. at 1065 n.4. 
134 See id. 
135 [d. (emphasis added). 
135 [d. 
137 627 F.Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986). 
138 See id. at 569. 
139 See id. at 569; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45(1984) (court should give executive branch considerable weight in 
administering the law); see also Sierra Club v. Costie, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C.Cir. 1981) (recog-
nizing the need for the President to monitor executive agency decisionmaking for consistency 
with administration policies). 
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supervisory powers, however, do not permit him to issue directives 
to executive agencies or to otherwise permit agency action that is 
in direct contravention to Congress's will.140 In this instance, Con-
gress explicitly stated that EPA was to promulgate the final per-
mitting standards by March 1, 1985. 141 When the Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF) brought this suit on May 30, 1985, EPA had 
not published the standards. 142 EPA submitted the standards for 
OMB review, but OMB did not begin its review until March 4, three 
days after EPA's deadline expired. 143 Executive Order 12,291 pro-
hibited EPA from publishing the standards until it responded to 
OMB's comments but by April 10, 1985, EPA still had not received 
the comments. 144 
Because an agency administrator must comply with statutory man-
dates, including deadlines, the court in Thomas held that OMB has 
no authority to cause an administrator to miss a statutory deadline. 145 
The court did not declare Executive Order 12,291 unconstitutional, 
but merely stated that OMB's review may not interfere with the 
Administrator's congressionally mandated, nondiscretionary du-
ties. 146 OMB may review proposed actions, but must cease its review 
at the time the action's deadline "is about to expire."147 
President Reagan's deregulation program during his first term in 
office was not as successful as he planned. Congress and the courts 
thwarted many of his efforts, and much of the American public 
opposed his program. l48 In light of the plan's unpopularity,' Mr. Rea-
gan shifted his deregulation plan from open and obvious manipulation 
to a much more subtle approach. The focus of deregulation in Pres-
ident Reagan's second term was on the courts' ability to prevent 
agency action through the Just Compensation Clause. 149 
B. Deregulation During President Reagan's Second Term 
President Reagan's deregulation scheme during his second term 
focused, in part, on the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation 
140 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F.Supp. 566, 570 (D. D.C. 1986). 
141 See id. at 567. 
142 See id. at 569. 
143 See id. at 568. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. at 571. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 104-05. A 1983 public poll showed that a majority of the 
American public believed that President Reagan was more interested in protecting companies 
that pollute than he was in protecting the environment. [d. at 105. 
149 See infra notes 151-68 and accompanying text. 
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Clause. 15O First, the government petitioned the Supreme Court to 
expand the definition of a regulatory taking, a move which would 
make some regulations too expensive to enforce. 151 Second, the Pres-
ident issued Executive Order 12,630, the Takings Order, to sensitize 
agencies to the financial burdens imposed upon the government when 
agency actions amount to regulatory takings. 152 
The typical takings claim features a private property owner as 
plaintiff and the government, either federal, state, or local, as de-
fendant. l53 The property owner argues that the regulation amounts 
to a taking of private property while the government defends, claim-
ing instead that the Just Compensation Clause was not meant to 
cover the type of regulation at issue. l54 President Reagan's deregu-
lation program changed the alignment of the parties, somewhat. 155 
In three takings claims heard by the Supreme Court during the first 
half of President Reagan's second term,l56 the federal government 
filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the landowners' claims that 
state governmental actions amounted to unconstitutional takings. 
The Reagan Administration embarked on an effort to use the 
Takings Clause as a "severe brake" upon governmental regulation 
of business and property uses by pressing the Supreme Court to 
expand the scope of the Just Compensation Clause. 157 For instance, 
the federal government filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the 
position that the government should be responsible for compensating 
affected landowners in situations amounting to temporary takings158 
in the case First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. County of Los Angeles. 159 First English Evangelical was a case 
in which a private property owner was temporarily denied the right 
to reconstruct its buildings after they were destroyed by a devas-
tating flood. 160 In an earlier case, the California Supreme Court had 
limited the remedies available for a regulatory taking to mandamus 
150 See infra notes 151-68 and accompanying text. 
151 See FRIED, supra note 65, at 183-85. 
152 See Exec. Order 12,630, supra note 10, at § l. 
153 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
154 See, e.g., id. 
155 See FRIED, supra note 65, at 185. 
156 See id. at 185. These cases were: First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 
825 (1987), and MacDonald v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
157 See FRIED, supra note 65, at 183. Charles Fried was Solicitor General for the Reagan 
Administration from 1985 to 1989. [d. at 13. 
158 See id. at 185. 
159 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
160 [d. at 307-08. 
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and declaratory judgment.161 The federal government, in First En-
glish Evangelical, petitioned the Court to rule that property owners 
whose property is taken, even only temporarily, by government 
regulation are entitled to monetary compensation. 162 This was an 
expansion of the scope of regulatory takings law because it means 
that the government must compensate individuals every time a reg-
ulation takes private property, even temporarily, rather than per-
mitting the government to repeal the offending regulation and for-
mulate a less-intrusive alternative. 163 
In addition to advocating a broader definition of a regulatory 
taking, President Reagan issued the Takings Order.164 The Takings 
Order requires agencies to be sensitive to the strain that the Fifth 
Amendment's Just Compensation Clause places on the public 
purse. 165 The Just Compensation Clause requires the government to 
compensate landowners when regulations are so overly burdensome 
that the regulations effectively take the property away from that 
owner.166 The more types of government actions the courts include 
within the purview of a regulatory taking, the more often the gov-
ernment has to pay compensation to private landowners. The Tak-
ings Order requires all executive agencies to review their actions to 
determine whether those actions might constitute a taking for which 
the government will be financially responsible;167 Any costs that are 
likely to be incurred because of successful takings claims can be 
calculated into the cost-benefit analysis that OMB reviews. l68 The 
Takings Order places restrictions on the implementation of govern-
ment actions that have takings implications. 169 
III. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,630: THE TAKINGS ORDER 
President Reagan enacted the Takings Order on the heels of two 
Supreme Court cases170 that expanded the definition of a regulatory 
161 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 32 (Cal. 1979). On appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court did not reach the question whether a state could limit remedies for a regulatory 
taking because it determined that no taking had actually occurred. See Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980). 
162 See FRIED, supra note 65, at 185. 
163 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
164 Exec. Order No. 12,630, .~upra note 10. 
165 See id. at § l(b). 
166 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
167 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 1. 
168 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying supra text. 
169 See generally Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4. 
170 The two cases are: First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
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taking. A regulatory taking is a government regulation that restricts 
the use of private property so much that the government effectively 
has appropriated the property from its owner. Pursuant to the Fifth 
Amendment, the government must compensate the property owner 
for a regulatory taking.17l As the Supreme Court expands the defi-
nition of a regulatory taking, the logical result is that more govern-
mental actions should fall within the scope of takings law. If this 
happens, the government is responsible for a greater number of 
compensation payments. President Reagan purports to have in-
tended the Takings Order to address this concern.172 
The Takings Order contains two stated purposes. 173 One of those 
purposes is to protect the public fisc from unnecessary expendi-
tures. 174 If the Constitution requires the government to pay com-
pensation for many of its regulatory action, the government should 
choose its regulatory programs very carefully or risk draining the 
public purse. The second purpose asserted in the Takings Order is 
to make executive agencies and departments sensitive to "constitu-
tionally protected property rights."175 
A. A Brief Look At Regulatory Takings 
Before examining the Takings Order itself, it may be best to 
understand the thing we call a "taking."176 The Fifth Amendment 
requires that the government pay "just compensation" to a property 
owner whenever it takes his or her property177 for public use. 178 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987). In an address to Congress in early 1988, President Reagan stated that his Adminis-
tration would take action in response to these cases. See Roger J. Marzulla, The New "Takings" 
Executive Order and Environmental Regulation--Collision or Cooperation?, 18 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst. 10,254, 10,257-58 (July, 1988)). 
171 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
172 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at preamble & § 1. 
173 See id. at § (1)(c). 
174Id. at § 1(c). 
175 See id. An examination of whether constitutionally protected property rights exist is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. Therefore, this Comment will focus only on the first stated 
purpose of the Takings Order, a concern for the public purse. 
176 See infra notes 303-469 and accompanying text for a more detailed examination of 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. 
l77 The term property includes not only the tangible property itself, but also the group of 
rights that an owner holds in that property, such as the right to use the property or to sell 
it. See Penn Centro Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 143-44 (1978) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting); see also United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945). 
178 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Public use, in this context, refers to the public's health, safety, 
and welfare. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 
(1987); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984); Hawaii Hous. Auth. 
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). 
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Initially, the definition of a "taking" was limited to the government's 
physical appropriation or invasion of private land. 179 In the 1922 
landmark case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,l80 Justice Holmes 
expanded the definition of a taking to include overly burdensome 
regulations which have the effect of physically appropriating the 
regulated property. lSI Justice Holmes instructed that a regulation 
that goes "too far" is tantamount to a taking, but failed to define 
what he meant by "too far. "182 
Similar to a physical taking, a regulatory taking-often referred to 
simply as a taking-requires the government to pay just compensa-
tion to the property owner.l83 The money used to compensate the 
property owner comes from the public fisc. 184 
B. The Takings Order 
The Takings Order has two main components. First, the Order 
instructs executive agencies and departmentsl85 to evaluate their 
actionsl86 to determine whether those actions have takings i~plica-
179 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992). 
180 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
181 See id. at 414-15. Justice Holmes explained that one factor to look at when assessing the 
regulation is the extent of the diminution of "values incident to property." He instructed that 
when those diminutions reach a "certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases" this constitutes 
a taking. Id. 
182 I d. at 415. 
183 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
184 H. Jane Lehman, Bill to Limit Federal Land Rules Gains; Measure Targets Impacts on 
Property Values, Use, WASH. POST, July 13, 1991, at El. 
185 Although this Comment uses the terms "executive agencies and departments," or often 
merely "agencies," the Takings Order also applies to 
military departments of the United States Government, and to any United States 
Government corporation, United States Government controlled corporation, or other 
establishment in the Executive Branch of the United States Government other than 
those entities defined as 'independent regulatory agencies' in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10). 
Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated 
Takings, supra note 15, at § III. 
186 By "actions," the Takings Order refers to 
proposed Federal regulations, proposed Federal legislation, comments on proposed 
Federal legislation, applications of Federal regulations to specific property, or Federal 
governmental actions physically invading or occupying private property, or other 
policy statements or actions related to federal regulations or direct physical invasion 
or occupancy, but does not include: (1) Actions in which the power of eminent domain 
is formally exercised; (2) Actions taken with respect to properties held in trust by 
the United States or in preparation for or during treaty negotiations with foreign 
nations; (3) Law enforcement actions involving seizure, for violations of law, of 
property for forfeiture or as evidence in criminal proceedings; (4) Studies or similar 
efforts of planning activities; (5) Communications between Federal agencies or de-
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tions. 187 If a proposed action has takings implications, the agency 
must explore alternatives that would be less intrusive to property 
owners and must estimate the dollar amount that the action might 
cost the government, should a court later hold that the action con-
stitutes a taking. ISS The agency must use this information when it 
makes decisions about implementing the action. 189 Furthermore, the 
agency must notify OMB that proposed actions have takings impli-
cations. l90 The second component of the Takings Order restricts an 
agency's ability, to the extent permitted by law, to implement a 
program once the agency determines that the program has takings 
implications. 191 
1. Takings Implications 
The Takings Order requires agencies to review their actions for 
"takings implications. "192 All actions-administrative, regulatory, or 
partments and State or local land-use planning agencies regarding planned or pro-
posed State or local actions regulating private property regardless of whether such 
communications are initiated by a Federal agency or department or are undertaken 
in response to an invitation by the State or local authority; (6) The placement of 
military facilities or military activities involving the use of Federal property alone; 
or (7) Any military or foreign affairs functions (including procurement functions 
thereunder), but not including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers civil works pro-
gram. 
Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 2(c). 
187 Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated 
Takings, supra note 15, at § VI(A)(2). 
188 See id. at § VI(A)(2)(c) & (d). 
189 See id. at § VI(A)(2). 
190 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 5(b). 
191 See id. at § 4. 
192 See id. at § 2(a). The Order states that an action with takings implications is one that "if 
implemented or enacted, could effect a taking." [d. For example, "rules and regulations that 
propose or implement licensing, permitting, or other condition requirements or limitations on 
private property use, or that require dedications or exactions from owners of private prop-
erty. " [d. The following are examples of agency actions that do not have takings implications: 
(1) Actions abolishing regulations, discontinuing governmental programs, or modi-
fying regulations in a manner that lessens interference with the use of private 
property; (2) Actions taken with respect to properties held in trust by the United 
States or in preparation for or during treaty negotiations with foreign nations; (3) 
Law enforcement actions involving seizure, for violations of law, of property for 
forfeiture or as evidence in criminal proceedings; (4) Studies or similar efforts of 
planning activities; (5) Communications between Federal agencies or departments 
and State or local land-use planning agencies regarding planned or proposed State 
or local actions regulating private property regardless of whether such communica-
tions are initiated by a Federal agency or department or are undertaken in response 
to an invitation by the State or local authority; (6) The placement of military facilities 
or military activities involving the use of Federal property alone; or (7) Any military 
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legislative-that may have an effect on "the use or value" of private 
property must be reviewed for takings implications. 193 The phrase 
"takings implications" is a term of art used in the Takings Order. It 
does not mean that a court would find that the agency's action 
constitutes a taking but instead, means that the action fits the defi-
nition of a taking provided by the Takings Order and its accompany-
ing guidelines. Specifically, the Guidelines for the Risk and Avoid-
ance of Unanticipated Takings (the Guidelines), 194 promulgated 
pursuant to the Takings Order, state: 
[w]hen an agency decisionmaker, in applying the criteria of Sec-
tion V(D) [of the Guidelines], determines that a policy or action 
appears to have an effect on private property sufficiently severe 
as to effectively deny economically viable use of any distinct 
legally protected property interest to its owner, or to have the 
effect of, or result in, a permanent or temporary physical occu-
pation, invasion, or deprivation, that appearance shall be deemed 
to give rise to a taking implication for purposes of the Executive 
Order and these Guidelines. . . .195 
Actions that pose a substantial risk that a taking may occur are 
deemed to have "significant takings implications."196 
The Guidelines were intended to assist the agencies in evaluating 
their actions for takings implications. 197 The Guidelines provide spe-
cific criteria for the agencies to use when evaluating their actions 
for takings implications. 198 These criteria should form the basis of 
the agency's determination of whether its action has takings impli-
cations. 199 These criteria are meant to reflect the principles of takings 
law. 200 
The Guidelines contain three main criteria for evaluating proposed 
actions. These criteria are: the character of the government action;201 
[d. 
or foreign affairs functions (including procurement functions thereunder), but not 
including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers civil works program. 
193 Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated 
Takings, supra note 15, at § 2(A). 
194 See id. 
195 [d. at § V(D)(3). 
196 [d. at § V(D)(3)(b)(1). A significant takings implication also exists when "insufficient 
information as to facts or law exists to enable an accurate assessment of whether significant 
takings consequences may result from the proposed policy or action." [d. at § V(D)(3)(b)(2). 
197 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § l(c). 
198 The criteria are found in the Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk 
and Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(D)(l) & (2). 
199 [d. at § V(D). 
200 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § l(c). 
201 Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated 
Takings, supra note 15, at § V(D)(2)(a). 
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the economic impact of the proposed action;202 and the action's inter-
ference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. 203 The 
Guidelines provide more specific guidance for applying these criteria 
to actions taken for health and safety purposes.204 Additionally, the 
Guidelines contain special criteria for regulatory programs that in-
volve permits or that may cause an undue delay. 205 
a. The Character of the Government's Action 
The first thing an agency must do when evaluating its proposed 
action is to examine the action's character.206 The action's 'character' 
relates to the purpose the action is meant to serve, including the 
legitimacy of that purpose and the likelihood that the purpose will 
be substantially advanced; the harm the action is meant to correct; 
and the effect the action will have on one or more of the owner's 
property interests. 207 
Examining an action's character involves several steps. First, the 
agency must examine the purpose the action is meant to serve. 208 If 
the agency's action is conducted pursuant to an enabling statute 
passed by Congress, the agency must examine the congressional 
purpose behind that statute. 209 A legitimate public purpose must be 
identified within the statute's text. 210 The agency should examine 
the text of the statute, together with the statute's legislative history, 
to determine whether the asserted legitimate public purpose is ac-
tually the true purpose of the statute. 211 Once the agency is satisfied 
that a legitimate public purpose exists, the agency must determine 
that its proposed action has the purpose of, and does, substantially 
advance the statute's legitimate public purpose. 212 Second, after 
identifying the harm that the statute was designed to redress, the 
agency must examine the degree to which the regulated property 
contributed to that harm.213 The harder it is to establish a nexus 
between the regulated property use and the harm, the more likely 
202Id. at § V(D)(2)(b). 
203 Id. at § V(D)(2)(c). 
204Id. at § V(C)(2). 
205Id. at § V(C)(1) & (3). 
206Id. at § V(D)(2)(a)(i). 
207Id. at § V(D)(2)(a). 
208 Id. at § V(D)(2)(a)(i). 
209 Id. 
210Id. 
211 Id. 
212Id. at § V(D)(2)(a)(ii). 
213Id. at § V(D)(2)(a)(iii). 
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it is that the action has takings implications. 214 Third, the agency 
must examine the extent to which its action "totally abrogates a 
property interest which has been historically viewed as an essential 
stick in the bundle of property rights. "215 
After examining the character of the action, the agency must then 
consider the action's economic impact on individual property own-
ers.216 This requires an inquiry into the losses the property owner 
will suffer because of the restrictions the action places on the owner's 
right to use his or her own land.217 
b. Economic Impact of the Proposed Action 
There are several factors to be considered when an agency ex-
amines the economic impact of a proposed action. 218 The agency must 
identify the individual economic and property interests that are 
likely to be affected,219 the degree to which the action will have an 
adverse economical impact on each property interest,220 and whether 
any benefits will flow to the property owner and mitigate or offset 
these adverse economic impacts.221 The agency also must approxi-
mate the duration of the adverse impact.222 To approximate the 
duration of the action's impact on a property owner, the agency must 
first determine whether the action is intended to permanently re-
strict property use, or whether the action will do so only temporarily. 
Additionally, the agency must consider the character and present 
use of the property.223 Finally, when evaluating the economic impact 
of its actions, the agency must investigate alternative actions to 
determine whether there is another way to achieve the statute's 
legitimate public purpose that will have less of an economic burden 
on the property owner. 224 
c. Interference with Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations 
The third criteria that an agency must consider when reviewing 
its actions for takings implications is the degree to which those 
214Id. 
215Id. at § V(D)(2)(a)(iv). 
216Id. at § V(D)(2)(b). 
217 See id. 
2IBId. 
219Id. at § V(D)(2)(b)(i). 
22°Id. at § V(D)(2)(b)(ii). 
221 Id. at § V(D)(2)(b)(iv). 
222 Id. at § V(D)(2)(b)(iii). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at § V(D)(2)(b)(v). 
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actions may interfere with the reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations of the property owner.225 While the Guidelines do not define 
"reasonable investment-backed expectation," it is a term that is often 
used by courts in determining whether a regulation amounts to a 
taking and refers to the expectation an individual may have that his 
or her private investment will reap future profits.226 Not all such 
expectations are legally recognized as property interests.227 N ever-
theless, the agency must consider interferences with any reasonable, 
investment-backed expectation, regardless of its status as a property 
interest. 228 
Although the Guidelines provide general principles to follow when-
ever an agency reviews an action, the Guidelines also provide addi-
tional criteria for evaluating particular actions.229 These actions in-
volve regulations that were promUlgated for health and safety 
purposes,230 governmental actions that will cause undue delays,231 
and permitting programs that make the granting of a permit condi-
tional upon some other event taking place. 232 
2. Additional Criteria For Certain Types of Actions 
In addition to following the Guidelines' general criteria, agencies 
must follow more specific directives when implementing health and 
safety programs, when using permitting programs that utilize permit 
conditions, and when the agency actions will cause undue delays. 233 
Unlike the general criteria discussed above, these directives restrict 
an agency's ability to implement actions that have takings implica-
tions if those actions involve health and safety regulations, condi-
225 [d. at § V(D)(2)(c). 
226 See e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992); Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979); Penn Centro Transp. 
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Until Lucas, none of these cases defined 
the term reasonable investment-backed expectation. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In his concurrence in Lucas, Justice 
Kennedy stated that when making a private investment for future profits, the expectations 
for those profits are reasonable if they are based upon "objective rules and customs" regarding 
how and to what degree the government will interfere with the investment. See id. 
227 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(D)(2)(c). 
228 [d. 
229 See generally id. at § V(C). 
230 See id. at § V(C)(2). 
231 See id. at § V(C)(3). 
232 See id. at § V(C)(l). 
233 See id. at § V(C). 
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tional permits, or undue delays.234 Additionally, the Takings Order 
restricts an agency's ability to implement any type of action by 
limiting the scope of the action relative to the harm the action 
addresses. 235 
a. Public Health and Safety 
Agencies must evaluate their actions taken to protect the public 
health and safety for takings implications.236 Although in takings 
jurisprudence courts give greater deference to health and safety 
regulations than to other types of regulations , 237 an agency cannot 
escape takings scrutiny merely by claiming that an action was pro-
posed for health and safety purposes.238 The Guidelines provide spe-
cific instructions on how an agency should apply the evaluative cri-
teria to health and safety actions. 239 
The Guidelines require an examination of both the harm that the 
agency intends to address and the actions the agency proposes to 
take to address that harm.240 The government must have designed 
the action for the purpose of preventing or mitigating a specifically 
identified health and safety risk;241 the action must substantially 
advance that purpose;242 and the action must not be disproportionate 
to the actual risk presented by the harmful property use.243 
The harm addressed in health and safety regulations must be both 
"real and substantial. "244 The Guidelines elaborate on this standard 
by stating that the harm to the public, should the risk materialize, 
must be genuine and not merely speculative.245 The agency is asked 
to estimate the severity of injury that the public would suffer, basing 
its estimation on the best available technology in the field. 246 Addi-
tionally, the agency must be able to support, by "meaningful evi-
234 See generally id. at § V(C). 
235 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(b). 
236 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(C)(2). 
237 See infra notes 312-22 and accompanying text. 
238 See infra notes 312-22 and accompanying text. 
239 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(C)(2). 
240 [d. at § V(C)(2). 
241 [d. at § V(C)(2)(a) & (b). 
242 [d. at § V(C)(2)(b). 
243 [d. 
244 [d. at § V(C)(2)(a). 
245 [d. 
246 [d. at § V(C)(2)(c)(ii). 
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dence," its claim that the regulated property use, in the absence of 
governmental intervention, may result in this harm to the public 
health and safety.247 Finally, the action should be no more restrictive 
on private property uses than is necessary to alleviate the risk of 
the expected harm.248 The less severe the property use's impact on 
the public's health and safety, the more likely the action has takings 
implications. 249 
In addition to restricting an agency's ability to implement health 
and safety regulations, the Takings Order restricts an agency's abil-
ity to use permitting programs. 250 Specifically, the Takings Order 
requires a substantial nexus between any conditions placed upon a 
permit and the public purpose behind the permitting program. 251 
b. Permitting Programs 
One way that agencies restrict harmful or undesirable private 
property uses is to employ permitting programs that restrict the 
number of people putting property to such a use or require that 
certain conditions be fulfilled before the applicant can receive a 
permit.252 For instance, before a hazardous waste management fa-
cility can obtain an operator's license, the regulations require that 
the applicant must meet certain conditions, such as the placement 
of monitoring wells around the facility.253 Both the Takings Order 
and Guidelines address permit conditions.254 While the Guidelines 
layout the criteria for determining whether these conditions have 
takings implications,255 the Takings Order affirmatively restricts the 
agency from implementing the conditions if they do have takings 
implications.256 To determine whether a permit condition has takings 
implications, the agency must question whether, constitutionally, it 
247 [d. at § V(C)(2)(a). The Guidelines do not define "meaningful evidence," but they do 
qualify the term with the words, "in light of available technology and information." [d. 
248 [d. at § V(C)(2)(b). 
249 [d. at § V(C)(2)(c). 
250 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(a). 
251 See id. 
252 James M. McElfish, Jr. The Takings Executive Order: Constitutional Jurisprudence or 
Political Philosophy? 18 Envtl. L. Rep. Envtl. L. Inst. at 10,476 (Nov. 1988). 
253 See id. 
254 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(a); see also Attorney General's 
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings, supra note 
15, at § V(C)(1). 
255 Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated 
Takings, supra note 15, at § V(C)(I). 
256 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(a). 
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could deny the permit altogether and, if so, for what legitimate public 
purpose.257 If any conditions placed upon the permit do not serve 
the same purpose that would be served by denying the permit al-
together, or if the conditions do not substantially advance that pur-
pose, the permitting program may have takings implications. 258 The 
Takings Order restricts agencies from· using permit conditions that 
have takings implications by stating that the agencies shall not im-
pose such conditions unless they substantially advance the same 
purpose that would be served by denying the permit altogether. 259 
c. Undue Delay 
The Guidelines instruct that undue delays in an agency's decision-
making process may amount to a taking, regardless of whether the 
government intended to cause such a delay.260 Any delay that inter-
feres with the property owner's use of his or her property may 
increase the compensation award. 261 In light of these takings risks, 
agencies must keep the length of their decisionmaking process to 
the minimum time period necessary. 262 
d. Restrictions on the Scope of the Regulation 
In addition to restricting the agencies' ability to implement actions 
involving health and safety regulations, permitting programs, and 
delays, the Takings Order also restricts the scope of the proposed 
action.263 Proposed actions that restrict private property use "shall 
not be disproportionate to the extent to which the use contributes 
to the overall problem that the restriction is imposed to redress."264 
This requirement is mentioned twice in the Takings Order: once 
when the Takings Order discusses health and safety regulations and 
a second time when the Takings Order refers to all types of regu-
lations. 
An examination of the action's takings implications is only one part 
of an agency's examination of its actions that affect the use or value 
257 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(C)(I). 
258 See id. at § V(C)(a) & (b). 
259 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(a). 
260 Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated 
Takings, supra note 15, at § V(C)(3). 
261Id. 
262 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(c). 
263 See id. at § 4(b). 
264 Id. 
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of property.265 The agency must also identify any less-intrusive al-
ternatives and must estimate the dollar amount that the action would 
cost the government if the action were found to be a taking by a 
court. 266 
C. The Takings Impact Assessment 
When an agency determines that its proposed action has takings 
implications, it must complete a Takings Impact Assessment 
(TIA).267 In addition to an exploration of the action's takings impli-
cations, the TIA also must identify any alternative actions that would 
be less restrictive on private property uses and must include an 
estimate of the potential compensation costs that the government 
will have to pay to affected landowners should a court find the 
proposed action to constitute a taking.268 The agency must then 
incorporate the TIA into the agency's normal decisionmaking pro-
cess. 269 The Guidelines instruct the decisionmaker to make "mean-
ingful use" of the TIA when deciding whether to implement an action 
that has takings implications. 270 
The TIA is not meant to be an internal document, exclusively. 271 
The Guidelines require that the agency disclose any takings impli-
cations in major rules submitted to OMB and, if OMB requests, 
make the TIA available to OMB.272 
D. Reporting Requirements 
The Takings Order imposes reporting requirements on the agen-
cies. 273 Pursuant to Executive Order 12,291, agencies must submit 
proposed actions to OMB for a cost-benefit review. 274 The Takings 
Order requires agencies to identify the takings implications, if any, 
of certain proposed actions and discuss the merits of those actions, 
265 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § VI(A)(2)(c). Of course, the requirement that a TIA must 
be completed is subject to the exceptions listed in the Takings Order. See Exec. Order No. 
12,630, supra note 10, at § 2(a)(1)-(7). 
266 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § VI(A)(2)(c)(ii) & (iii). 
267 See id. at § VI(A)(2). 
268 See id. at § VI(A)(2)(c). 
269 See id. at § VI(A)(2)(a). 
270 [d. at § VI(A)(2). 
271 See id. at § VI(B)(I). 
272 See id. 
273 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 5(b). 
274 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 12, at § 3(c). 
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in light of the takings implications, in any submissions it must make 
to OMB regarding that action. 275 At OMB's request, the agency must 
also submit a copy of the TIA to OMB. 276 
The Guidelines do not require the agency to report takings impli-
cations in all circumstances. 277 When submitting a proposed action 
to OMB for review, the agency must identify the action's takings 
implications only if the action constitutes a "major" rule under Ex-
ecutive Order 12,291,278 or in all circumstances if the action has 
"significant takings implications."279 At its discretion, however, OMB 
may require identification of takings implications for any proposed 
rule. 280 In those actions where reporting of takings implications is 
required, the agency must also discuss the merits of the action, in 
light of the takings implications. 281 The reporting requirement means 
that OMB will be notified that a proposed action has takings impli-
cations and, upon its own request, OMB will be supplied with an 
estimation of the potential cost of any proposed action that has 
takings implications. 
In addition, agencies must notify OMB of all past takings awards 
rendered against one of the agency's existing rules or regulations 
and of all takings claims currently pending. 282 Agencies were to 
submit to OMB a compilation of all such awards for the years 1985 
through 1987, and were to submit, annually, a report of any such 
awards for each year thereafter. 283 No agency284 reported any tak-
ings awards levied against one of their regulations for the fiscal 
years 1985 through 1987.285 
The annual reports submitted to OMB regarding successful tak-
ings claims establish that although many takings claims are filed 
275 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § VI(B)(l). 
276 See id. 
277 See id. 
278 I d. at § VI(B)(l)(a). For a definition of "major" rule, see supra note 114. 
279 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § VI(B)(1)(b). For a definition of "significant takings 
implications," see supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
280 Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated 
Takings, supra note 15, at § VI(B)(l)(c). 
281 I d. at § VI(B)(l). 
282 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 5(c). 
283 Id. at § 5(d). 
284 In this instance, the term "agency" is limited to actual executive agencies and does not 
include other executive branch departments and entities. 
285 McElfish, supra note 252, at 10,478. Some executive branch departments, however, did 
report successful takings claims against their regulatory actions. I d. 
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against the federal government each year, very few are successful. 286 
For example, examine the takings claims against the Land and 
Natural Resources Division (the Division) of the United States De-
partment of Justice. In 1988, Roger Marzulla, then-head of the Di-
vision, claimed there were $1 billion worth of takings claims pending 
against his division. 287 Yet the Division's submission to OMB pur-
suant to the Takings Order indicate that for the years 1985, 1986, 
and 1987 successful takings awards amounted to only $23.1 million, 
$5.5 million, and $20.2 million, respectively.288 Of those awards, most 
were the result of physical appropriation or occupation of private 
property and not a result of regulatory activities. 289 
E. OMB Oversight of The Takings Order 
The Takings Order gives the Director of OMB oversight authority 
to ensure compliance with the operative directives of the Takings 
Order.290 In addition to ensuring compliance, the Director of OMB 
may also take action to ensure that each agency has properly ac-
counted for any successful takings claim rendered against it, in the 
agency's budget submissions to OMB.291 
F. Current Status of the Takings Order and the Private Property 
Rights Act 
The Takings Order remains effective today, although members of 
Congress have urged President Clinton to review the order to de-
termine whether it is detrimental to regulations promulgated for 
health and safety or environmental purposes. 292 On January 21, 1993 
Senator Bob Dole (R. Kan.) reintroduced the Private Property 
Rights Act of 1993 (the Act),293 originally introduced by Senator 
286 See id. 
287 See Marzulla, supra note 170, at 10,257. Mr. Marzulla claims that the heavy takings 
docket was an impetus for the creation of the Takings Order. See id. 
288 McElfish, supra note 252, at 10,478. 
289 See id. For the years 1985, 1986, and 1987 nonregulatory takings made up at least 90.9%, 
74.6%, and 69.8%, respectively, of takings awards against the Land and Natural Resources 
Division of the United States Department of Justice. See id. 
290 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 5(e)(I). 
291Id. 
292 Letter from Senator Chafee to President Bill Clinton (Jan. 1993), in 133 CONGo REC. 
S1360 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993). 
293 S. 177, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), in 139 CONG.REC. S610 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993). 
The bill was introduced as S. 177 and is cosponsored by many Republican senators. A similar 
bill is pending in the House of Representatives, as H.R. 385, sponsored by two Republicans 
and no Democrats. 
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Steve Symms (R. Idaho).294 The bill attempts to codify the Takings 
Order into public law, thus eliminating the possibility that President 
Clinton, or future presidents, may revoke the Order. 295 
The Act requires executive agencies and departments to comply 
with the directives of the Takings Order.296 If enacted, the Act would 
block the implementation of any new regulations until the Attorney 
General has certified that the agency acted in compliance with the 
Takings Order when promulgating the regulation. 297 Unlike the Tak-
ings Order, the Act creates a private cause of action against agencies 
for noncompliance and those persons adversely affected by the agen-
cy's action will have standing to bring suit. 298 Judicial review is 
limited to a procedural issue, whether the agency received certifi-
cation of compliance with Executive Order 12,630 from the Attorney 
General and "similar procedures. "299 Supporters of the Act claim that 
it will safeguard property owners, protect Fifth Amendment prop-
erty rights, and will promote the interests of the business commu-
nity.30o 
IV. REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Takings Order was enacted on the heels of two Supreme Court 
cases which expanded the definition of a regulatory taking. 301 The 
Order, purportedly, was modeled on then-current takings law. 302 This 
Section, therefore, will focus on regulatory takings jurisprudence as 
the state of the law existed in March of 1988, when the Takings 
294 See Editorial Needed: Protection For Property Rights, WASH. TIMES, May 14, 1992, at 
G2. Senator Symms' bill passed the Senate in the Spring of 1992, but then died. See Katherine 
Shaver, California Farming Groups Applaud ESPY's Work Without Examining His Record, 
ST. NEWS SER., Jan. 29, 1993. 
296 See 139 Congo Rec. S610 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
296 See S. 177, supra note 293. 
297Id. The operative language of the Act reads: 
Id. 
No regulation . . . shall become effective until the issuing agency is certified to be in 
compliance with Executive Order 12630, as in effect in 1991, the language of which 
is hereby incorporated by reference and enacted into public law, to assess the poten-
tial for the taking of private property in the course of federal regulatory activity, with 
the goal of minimizing such where possible. 
298 S. 177, supra note 293, at § 4(a). 
299 Id. The Act does not define the term "similar procedures." 
300 See 139 CONGo REC. S610 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Wallop). 
301 See supra note 18. 
302 Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § l(a). 
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Order was drafted. This Section will then examine new develop-
ments in takings law. 
A. The Character of the Action and its Impact on the Property 
Owner 
In 1988, no case had announced a set formula or rule for deter-
mining when a regulation went so far as to constitute a taking of 
private property.303 While the Court had identified two important 
criteria for determining when a government action constitutes a 
taking, the weight it gave each criterion varied, depending upon the 
facts of each particular case.304 The two criteria that the Court 
examined in regulatory takings claims were the nature of the gov-
ernment's action and the adverse impact the action had on the prop-
erty owner. 305 An oft-cited rule of thumb, articulated in Agins v. 
City of Tiburon,306 is that a regulation may affect a taking if the 
regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests 
... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land."307 The 
Agins Court proposed that courts should balance the public interest 
against the property owner's private harm. 308 
One factor courts examined in takings claims were whether the 
regulation in question substantially advances a legitimate state in-
terest. 309 To make this determination, the courts examined the reg-
ulation itself, including its purpose and the likelihood that it will 
achieve that purpose. 310 The regulation must have been implemented 
for the purpose of serving a legitimate state interest. 311 The United 
303 E.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992); Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987). 
304 See id. 
305 See id.; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Other cases break 
this down into three categories: economic impact of the regulation; interference with invest-
ment backed expectations; and character of the government's action. See, e.g., MacDonald, 
Sommers & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). 
306 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
307 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 262; accord Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 485. 
308 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 262. 
309 See, e.g. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 485-88; Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Centro Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
310 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 485-88; Agins v. City 
of Tiburon, 477 U.S. at 260; Penn Centro Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 124. 
311 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 485-88; Agins v. City 
of Tiburon, 477 U.S. at 260; Penn Centro Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 124. 
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States Supreme Court has not articulated a standard for determining 
what constitutes a legitimate public interest. 312 Instead, the respon-
sibility for determining what constitutes a public purpose falls to the 
legislature, with very little room for review by the courts. 313 The 
Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,314 asserted that 
"[sJubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature 
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh 
conclusive. "315 
Although courts generally defer to a legislature's determination 
of what constitutes a public purpose, courts may inquire into whether 
the asserted purpose is the government's true purpose for acting. 316 
In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,317 for instance, although the iden-
tified purpose of a coal mining regulation was safety, an examination 
of the regulation's operative language revealed that safety was not 
the true goal behind the State's action. 318 A court, however, should 
not reject a regulation merely because the regulation is somewhat 
overinclusive or underinclusive. 319 
Despite its inability to define the phrase "legitimate state inter-
est," the Court in 1987, made it clear that "a broad range of govern-
mental purposes" satisfied this requirement. 32o One such legitimate 
public purpose was regulating for health and safety reasons. 321 Under 
the umbrella of health and safety regulations, the government, 
amongst other things, 
may condemn unsafe structures, may close unlawful business 
operations, may destroy infected trees, and surely may restrict 
access to hazardous areas-for example, land on which radioac-
tive materials have been discharged, land in the path of a lava 
flow, or land in the path of a potentially life-threatening flood. 322 
In addition to having a legitimate public purpose, the regulation 
must "substantially advance" that purpose. 323 As in the Court's han-
312 NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 834. 
313 See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). 
314 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
315 Id. at 239 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)). 
316 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 487 n.16. 
317 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
318 See id. at 413-14 (clear from statute that public purpose was limited); accord Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 487 n. 16. 
319 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 487 n.16; see also 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926). 
320 NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 834-35. 
321 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 325-26 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
322Id. 
323 See, e.g., NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3; Agins v. City of 
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dling of the definition of "legitimate state interest," the Court has 
not defined what connection is necessary between a regulation and 
its corresponding public purpose to constitute substantially advanc-
ing that purpose. 324 The only help the Court has provided is that 
"substantially advance" is a higher level of review than the "ratio-
nally related" standard of judicial review. 325 The Court, however, 
has given obvious illustrations of what does substantially advance a 
legitimate public purpose326 and what does not substantially advance 
a legitimate public purpose. 327 Cutting down infected trees does 
substantially advance the public purpose of quelling the spread of 
infection amongst the local tree population. 328 A public easement 
along the seashore, however, does not substantially advance the 
public purpose of repairing psychological harm to citizens whose view 
of the ocean is obstructed by a wall of houses. 329 
The second factor that courts must examine in a takings analysis 
is the action's impact on the private property owner.330 There are 
several variations to this theme. The Court may ask to what degree 
the action denied the owner use of his or her property, to what 
extent the action denied the owner "viable economic use" of the 
property,331 to what degree the action interfered with a reasonable 
investment-backed expectation of the owner,332 or to what degree 
the regulation caused a diminution of the property's value. 333 In 1988, 
while the economic impact a property owner suffered was relevant 
Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The "substantially advance" requirement subjects the 
regulation to a higher level of scrutiny than that suggested by Justice Brennan. In his dissent, 
Justice Brennan argued that the standard of review was, and had long been, whether the 
governmental body "could rationally have decided that the measure adopted might achieve 
the State's objective." Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. at 843 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)) 
(emphasis in original). 
324 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 834. 
325 See id. at 834 n.3. 
326 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928). 
327 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 837. 
328 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. at 280. 
329 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 837. 
330 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,485-88 (1987); Agins 
v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255,260 (1980); Penn Centro Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
331 See Agins V. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. at 260. 
332 See, e.g., Lucas V. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Andrus V. Allard, 
444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979); Penn Centro Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 124. 
333 See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). When the diminution in value 
"reaches a certain magnitUde, ... there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compen-
sation to sustain the act." I d. 
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to the Court's determination of whether a taking occurred, it was 
not definitive. 334 
B. The 1987 Takings Cases 
The Supreme Court heard three well-known regulatory takings 
cases in 1987.335 Two of these cases purportedly expanded the scope 
of a regulatory taking. These cases are First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,336 and Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Commission. 337 The third case, Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,338 neither expanded 
nor contracted the definition of regulatory taking, but instead reaf-
firmed that the government's purpose for passing regulations is a 
critical criterion for determining whether the regulation constitutes 
a taking. 339 
1. Keystone Bituminous: The Nature of The Government's Action 
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,340 the ma-
jority implied that regulations passed for legitimate health and safety 
purposes, such as regulations controlling public nuisances, do not 
constitute a taking regardless of the regulation'S impact on the pri-
vate property owner.341 Because there was no evidence that the 
property owners in this case suffered an adverse impact sufficient 
to constitute a taking, the Court did not reach the question whether 
the nature of the government's action alone is sufficient to sustain a 
regulation against a taking claim. 342 Keystone Bituminous, there-
fore, stands for the concept that the government's purpose in reg-
ulating land-use is a critical element in a regulatory takings analysis; 
one that should not be dismissed lightly. 343 
334 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 490; see also Goldblatt 
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). But see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 
S.Ct. at 2899 (in 1992, complete denial of economically beneficial use of property is sufficient 
to constitute a taking unless the government acted to eradicate a common law nuisance). 
335 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
336 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
337 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
338 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
339 See id. at 492. 
340 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
341 See id. at 492. 
342 See id. 
343 See id. 
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In 1966, the Pennsylvania legislature determined that coal mine 
subsidence-the sinking of the strata and land surface above a coal 
mine-posed a safety threat to the public, to the environment, and 
to the physical structure of houses and other buildings above the 
mine. 344 In response to this threat, the State legislature authorized 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) 
to implement a program designed to prevent or minimize coal mine 
subsidence. 345 To minimize subsidence danger, DER's program re-
quired that approximately 50% of the subsurface coal be left in place 
as surface support. 346 In a 1982 facial challenge to the constitution-
ality of the 50% rule, an association of coal mine operators claimed 
that the rule constituted an unconstitutional taking of private prop-
erty without payment of compensation. 347 In their suit, the petition-
ers never claimed that the 50% rule rendered their mines unprofit-
able, but rather alleged that the rule extinguished all of the value 
of the coal that the operators were required to leave behind, thereby 
denying them all economically viable use of that portion of their 
coal. 348 
The trial court made no findings of fact but, instead, the parties 
stipulated the facts as follows. The petitioners owned or operated 
thirteen mines that contained, cumulatively, over 1.46 billion tons of 
coal. 349 The 50% rule required the petitioners to leave almost 27 
million tons, or approximately 2% of the coal in the ground to prevent 
subsidence.35o The 50% rule is not the sole reason coal is left behind 
in a mine.351 Regardless of DER's rule, only 75% of the petitioners' 
coal could be profitably mined352 because the physical process of 
underground coal mining does not permit all of the coal to be re-
344 See id. at 477. Coal mine subsidence weakens the ground, causing sinkholes that make 
land development or farming impossible; damages the foundations, walls, and physical integ-
rity of buildings; cracks underground oil, gas, and electric lines; sinks roads; and drains ponds 
and other groundwater. Water drained from the surface, as well as oil from severed lines, 
may enter and fill the mine itself. See id. at 476 n.2. 
345 See id. at 477. 
346 See id. The petitioners complained also about § 6 of the statute that authorized the DER 
to revoke the mining license of any mining operation that caused damage to a structure 
protected by § 4 when "the operator has not within 6 months either repaired the damage, 
satisfied any claims arising therefrom, or deposited a sum equal to the reasonable cost of 
repair with the DER as security." See id. 
347 See id. 
348 See id. at 496. 
349 See id. 
350 See id. 
351 See id. at 500. 
352 See id. 
\ 
I' 
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moved.353 Some coal must be left behind to support the structure of 
the mine. 354 
Applying the two-part analysis announced in Agins v. City of 
Tiburon,355 the Court first examined the nature of DER's action. 356 
The purpose behind the 50% rule was to prevent or mitigate the 
harm that coal mine subsidence can cause to the public's safety, the 
environment, and the structures on the land.357 The Court, accepting 
as true the trial court's determination that the 50% rule was intended 
to serve a legitimate public purpose, distinguished358 the landmark 
case Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,359 in which a similar regulation 
was found to be a taking because it was passed for private economic 
reasons, rather than public safety purposes. 360 
The Keystone Bituminous Court underscored the long-followed 
principle that the nuisance exception, which allows the government 
to prevent harmful uses of private property without paying compen-
sation, encompasses regulations passed for public health and safety 
purposes. 361 The nuisance exception, articulated one hundred years 
earlier in Mugler v. Kansas,362 had foundations in the canon that all 
property in this country is held subject to the maxim sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas, which means that property owners should 
not use their property in ways that harm others.363 Although this 
maxim is the principle behind the common law tort of nuisance,364 
the Mugler Court did not limit its exception to common law nuis-
ances. Instead, the nuisance exception extended to "nuisance-like" 
353 See id. at 496. 
354 See id. 
355 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
356 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1987). 
357 See id. 
358 See id. at 486. 
359 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
S60 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 485-86. 
361 See id. at 488-92. 
362 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Although Mugler was decided 35 years before Justice Holmes 
articulated the concept of a regulatory taking in Pennsylvania Coal, the latter case did not 
overturn the nuisance exception. In fact, the Court in Miller v. Schoene reaffirmed the 
nuisance exception five years after Pennsylvania Coal. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 
279-80 (1928). 
363 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887); accord Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n 
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 491-92; Penn Centro Transp. CO. V. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
104, 125 (1978); Eastlake V. Forest City Enter. Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.B (1976); Goldblatt 
V. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1928); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. at 280; Village of 
Euclid V. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
364 See PLATER ET. AL., supra note 35, at 103 n.1. 
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activities. 365 The Mugler Court stated that the government's au-
thority to prevent a landowner from using his or her land in ways 
that are harmful to others cannot be burdened by requiring the 
government to compensate the landowner for any economic losses 
that he or she may have suffered as a result of not being able to use 
the land in a harmful way.366 The relevant issue is whether the 
regulated property use is dangerous to the public safety, health, or 
welfare. 367 
Many cases between Mugler and Keystone applied the nuisance 
exception to regulations that were promulgated to protect the public 
health, safety, or welfare. 368 In a footnote, the Keystone Bituminous 
Court acknowledged Justice Rehnquist's limitation on the nuisance 
exception: "[t]he nuisance exception ... is not coterminous with the 
police power itself. "369 Five years later, however, the Court in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council370 stated it was abundantly clear 
that at the time Keystone Bituminous was decided, the nuisance 
exception was coterminous with the police power. 371 
Consistent with the public protection offered by the nuisance ex-
ception is the idea that we all benefit from health and safety regu-
lations. 372 Although an individual may feel unfairly burdened by land-
use restrictions, that individual benefits when the same regulation 
365 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. at 668-69. 
366 See id.; accord Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914) 
(the State's police powers permit the State to extend the nuisance exception as far as is 
necessary to protect the public). 
367 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 489. 
368 See generally Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 
(1974); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); 
Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. 272 U.S. at 388-89; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 
394 (1915). 
369 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 491 n.20 (quoting Penn 
Centro Transp. CO. V. Mahon, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
370 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
371 Id. at 2897. The Court supported this statement with quotes from Penn Centro Transp. 
CO. V. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978){"where State 'reasonably concluders] that 
'the health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular 
contemplated uses of land,' compensation need not accompany prohibition"); and Nollan V. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987) ("[o]ur cases have not elaborated on 
the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest[,l' [but] [t]hey have 
made clear . . . that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfy these 
requirements."'). The Lucas Court, implying that the exception had swallowed the rule, 
limited the nuisance exception to uses that the common law of nuisance and property principles 
prohibit. See Lucas V. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2898-99. 
372 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n V. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987). 
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prevents a neighbor from using his or her property in a harmful 
way.373 Known as "reciprocity of advantage," this principle is based 
on the idea that the burden of the regulation will be shared by many 
property owners and each will benefit from the other's burden. 374 A 
good example is a zoning ordinance, where each individual in a 
neighborhood is burdened by building restrictions but simulta-
neously benefits because the zoning ordinance prevents a neighbor 
from erecting a mini-mall. Reciprocity of advantage is an exception 
to the Takings Clause. 375 
The second half of the Keystone Bituminous decision, examining 
the economic impact of the 50% rule, is procedurally inconsistent 
with the first half of that decision. 376 Because the petitioners' claim 
amounted to a facial challenge, the majority, in the second part of 
the decision, stated that it should follow the facial challenge test for 
constitutionality,377 laid out in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc. 378 Hodel established that when adjudicating 
a facial challenge to a taking on constitutional grounds, the Court 
need only inquire whether the governmental action "denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land .... "379 Nevertheless, the Court 
went ahead and looked at the nature of the government's action in 
the first part of its opinion. 380 
The question of whether the 50% rule denied the mine owners 
economically viable use of their property turned on how the Court 
defined the property interest subject to the rule. 381 The majority and 
dissent differed sharply on this point. 382 The rule, as set out in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York,383 was that the Court 
should not divide a parcel of property into discrete segments, but 
instead should examine the regulation's impact on "the parcel as a 
whole."384 The Keystone Bituminous Court determined that although 
373 See id. 
374 See id. 
375 See Penn Centro Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
376 See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicits, 480 U.S. 470 (1978). 
377 See id. at 494. 
378 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
379 Id. at 295-96 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 257, 260 (1980)); accord Penn 
Centro Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
380 See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 485-93. 
381 See id. at 497. 
382 See generally id. 
383 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
384 Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added); accord Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 
480 U.S. at 497; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). 
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the 50% rule destroyed nearly all value in the 27 million tons of coal, 
this loss was minimal relative to the petitioners' entire quantity of 
coal. 385 One year after Penn Central, the Court in Andrus v~ Al-
lard,386 echoed this rule when it stated that, although the govern-
ment action prohibited the most profitable use of the owner's prop-
erty, "where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, 
the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because 
the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. "387 
Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist argued that there was no bundle of 
property rights in the Keystone Bituminous case, but instead there 
was only one property right to the 27 million tons of coal-the right 
to mine the coal-and that the owners were denied this right alto-
gether. 388 Unlike the owners in Andrus who, although they could no 
longer sell their Native American artifacts containing protected bird 
feathers, retained the right to possess and transport their property, 
to display the artifacts for profit, or to donate them,389 the coal mine 
operators retained very few rights in their coal.390 Unlike Native 
American artifacts, unmined coal cannot be transported, displayed, 
or donated. 391 Thus, Justice Rehnquist argued, the only right one 
has in underground coal is "the right to mine it. "392 He further 
asserted that because the DER's rule completely abrogated peti-
tioners' only right to this segment of the coal, this segment consti-
tutes a discrete and separate property interest. 393 Justice Rehnquist 
likened the government's action to a physical appropriation of the 
coal, for which the government must pay compensation.394 The ma-
jority rejected his assertions that the action amounted to a physical 
appropriation and that the 27 million tons constituted a separate, 
discrete property interest.395 Instead, the majority held that the 
diminution of value would be based upon the entire quantity of coal 
and not on merely the 27 million tons.396 
385 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 496. 
385 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
387Id. at 65-66. 
388 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). 
389 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66. 
390 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
391 See id. 
392 ld. 
39S See id. 
394 See id. 
395 See id. at 497. 
S96 See id. 
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2. First English Evangelical: Temporary Takings 
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles,397 a local ordinance temporarily prohibited 
all construction in an area of land recently devastated by a flood. 398 
The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale (the 
Church) owned twenty-one acres of this land, located at the bottom 
of a canyon in the Angeles National Forest.399 On its property, the 
Church operated a retreat center for handicapped children.4°O The 
retreat center was situated along the banks of a creek and was 
located downstream of a natural watershed-an area of trees and 
other vegetation that slows the advancement of any water spilling 
over the river's banks, allowing the ground time to absorb the water, 
thus helping to prevent floods. 401 In 1977, a fire destroyed nearly 
three thousand acres of the upstream watershed, leaving the banks 
of the creek vulnerable to flooding. 402 One year later, a storm dropped 
eleven inches of rain in the Angeles National Forest, causing water 
to spill over the banks of the creek and, with no watershed to slow 
its pace, rage through the canyon destroying buildings and drowning 
ten people. 403 Luckily, the retreat center was closed for the week. 404 
The Church sustained no loss of life,405 but the flood did destroy the 
bunkhouses, dining hall, and other buildings of the retreat center. 406 
In response to the flood, Los Angeles County passed an ordinance 
temporarily prohibiting all construction, including reconstruction, in 
the area while the County studied safe uses to which the land might 
be put, given the area's propensity to flood. 407 One month later, the 
397 482 u.s. 304 (1987). 
398 [d. at 307. 
399 [d. 
400 [d. 
401 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 
Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1357 (1989). The vegetation of a watershed slows the movement of the 
water which allows the water to then percolate into the soil or to be "carried away by streams." 
See id. at 1357 n.l. 
402 First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
307 (1987). 
403 [d. 
404 [d. 
405 [d. 
406 [d. 
407 [d. The ordinance, Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 stated, in pertinent part, 
[d. 
tal person shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure, 
any portion of which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of the 
interim flood protection area located in Mill Creek Canyon. . . . 
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Church filed suit for compensation, claiming, among other things, 
that the ordinance constituted an uncompensated taking.408 The Su-
perior Court of California dismissed the case, stating that in Cali-
fornia a property owner could not sue the state for compensation 
but instead only could file an action for mandamus or for declaratory 
relief. 409 
The issue before the Supreme Court in First English Evangelical 
was limited to whether the government must pay compensation 
when it temporarily, rather than permanently, denies an owner all 
use of his or her property, or whether the owner is merely entitled 
to injunctive relief. 410 Because no determination was made at trial 
regarding if, and to what extent, the ordinance advanced a legitimate 
public purpose or to what degree the ordinance interfered with the 
owner's use of its property,4l1 the Supreme Court could not reach 
the question of whether the ordinance amounted to a taking.412 In-
stead, for the purposes of its inquiry into the ordinance's limited 
remedies, the Court assumed that the ordinance constituted a tak-
ing.413 The Court likened the ordinance's eight-year effect on the 
property owner-for which the government was being asked to pay 
compensation-to a situation where the government repeals a reg-
ulation after a court holds that regulation to constitute a taking. 414 
The question amounted to whether, if a court holds a regulation to 
be a taking and the government, in response, repeals the regulation, 
the government nevertheless must pay compensation for the period 
of time when the regulation was effective. 415 
Drawing on cases where the government was held responsible for 
compensating the owner when the government temporarily physi-
cally appropriated the owner's property,416 the Court held that if the 
408 [d. at 308. 
409 [d. at 308-09. 
410 See id. at 321. 
411 See id. at 308-09. 
412 Earlier cases stated that a court should not determine the constitutionality of a regulation 
as it applies to a particular case without examining the facts of that particular case. See, e.g., 
Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972). 
413 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 322 (1987). The Court assumed that the ordinance "has denied appellant all use of 
its property for a considerable period of years. . . ." [d. 
414 See id. at 317-18. 
415 See id. 
416 United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26 (1958); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 
338 U.S. 1, 15 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 (1946); United 
States v. General Motors Corp., 327 U.S. 373,382 (1945). 
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ordinance were to constitute a taking,417 then the same ordinance, if 
effective only temporarily, would constitute a temporary taking. 418 
The government cannot avoid paying compensation by repealing the 
regulation.419 If, however, the government does choose to repeal the 
regulation, it is responsible for compensating the affected owner 
only for the period of time during which the regulation was effec-
tive. 420 The government need not pay compensation for a permanent 
taking.421 In First English, if the lower court, on remand, were to 
find that the ordinance did amount to a taking, the County could not 
merely invalidate the ordinance, but instead would have to compen-
sate the Church for the period during which the ordinance denied 
the Church all use of its property. 422 
The First English holding was limited to the Court's pronounce-
ment about the remedies available for temporary takings. 423 Tem-
porary takings do not include the economic impact suffered by pri-
vate property owners during governmental decisionmaking.424 
Sometimes, governmental decisionmaking regarding a particular 
piece of land may cause the value of that land to fluctuate. 425 Dimin-
ution in property value during governmental decisionmaking, how-
ever, is an "incident of ownership," and not a Fifth Amendment 
taking.426 Additionally, restricted use of the property during govern-
mental decisionmaking does not necessarily implicate a taking.427 As 
the Court pointed out in Agins v. City of Tiburon,428 although land-
owners may have been unable to sell their land during a condem-
nation proceeding, this did not prevent them from selling the land 
when the proceeding was over.429 Delays in decisionmaking, which 
417 On remand, the California Court of Appeals determined that no taking had occurred 
because the ordinance substantially furthered the legitimate state interest of health and safety 
and also because the ordinance did not deny the Church all use of its property. See First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 
3d 1353, 136,.'i-74 (1989). 
418 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
419 See id. 
420 See id. at 319. 
421 See id. 
422 See id. at 321. 
423 See id. 
424 See id. Examples include "normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning 
ordinances, variances, and the like .... " Id. 
425 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980). 
426 See id. 
427 See id. 
428 [d. 
429 See id. 
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the First English Court explicitly distinguished, are different from 
temporary takings. 430 
3. N ollan: Conditional Permits 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,431 the Court exam-
ined the constitutionality of conditions imposed upon land-use per-
mitS.432 The N ollans, wishing to tear down an ocean-side bungalow 
and replace it with a much larger house, requested a building permit 
from the California Coastal Commission (the Commission).433 The 
Commission agreed to grant the permit on the condition that the 
N ollans grant an easement allowing the public to pass across the 
ocean side of their property.434 The easement was to run parallel 
with the ocean, bordering the ocean's high tide line on one side and 
the Nollans' seawall on the other. 435 The Nollans brought suit on the 
grounds that the permit condition violated the Takings Clause. 436 
By agreeing to the condition, the N ollans would forfeit their right 
to exclude people from the portion of their property that would be 
subject to the easement.437 The right to exclude people from one's 
property is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property."438 Additionally, the 
public's presence in the N ollans' back yard would amount to a phys-
ical occupation of that portion of the property.439 The government 
cannot physically occupy a piece of property, nor can they take land 
by proxy through the public, without compensating the property 
owner.440 Having settled this, the Court asked the following ques-
tion. If an outright demand by the government to grant a public 
easement would require the payment of just compensation, does 
conditioning a land-use permit on such a demand similarly constitute 
a taking? The Court held that it does. 441 
430 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
431 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
432 See id. 
433 [d. at 827-28. 
434 [d. at 828. 
435 [d. 
436 [d. 
437 See id. at 831. 
438 [d. 
439 See id. at 832. 
440 See id. 
441 See id. at 837. 
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For purposes of its analysis, and without making a determination 
of its own, the Court accepted as legitimate the public purpose 
asserted by the Commission. 442 In short, the Nollans' new house 
would be harmful to the public because it would contribute to a 
"wall" of houses that blocked the public's view of the ocean, diminish 
the public nature of the beach, and interfere with the public's ability 
to go to the ocean from the street and to walk along the ocean's 
shore. 443 The easement of passage along the N ollans' property was 
meant to offset the damage that the construction of the N ollans' new 
house would cause to the public. 444 
The N ollan Court, established a nexus requirement between the 
permit condition and the public purpose justifying the permitting 
program, itself. 445 In the N ollan case, the public harm that the 
permit program addressed flowed directly from the public's inability 
to see or reach the ocean from the street in front of the Nollan's 
house. 446 It was unlikely that an easement allowing the public to 
walk along the beach in front of the Nollan's home would serve the 
interests of those people who found themselves on the street in front 
of the Nollan's home and could not see the beach. 447 Because the 
grant of an easement would not substantially advance the Commis-
sion's attempts to eradicate the public harm, the nexus requirement 
was not satisfied. 448 Several commentators believe that this is the 
extent of the Nollan Court's holding. 449 They believe the Court only 
states in dictum that permit conditions must substantially advance 
the same purpose that would be served by denying the permit al-
together. 450 
442 See id. at 835. The Court, however, did note that if the Commission's purpose was to 
provide a continuous strip of beach along the length of the shore for public passage, this would 
require an exercise of the State's power of eminent domain. [d. at 841. 
443 [d. at 828-29. The Commission stated that the wall of houses, to which the Nollan's 
house would contribute, would prevent the public "psychologically ... from realizing a stretch 
of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit," and the house would "burden 
the public's ability to traverse to and along the shorefront." [d. 
444 [d. 
445 See id. at 837. 
446 [d. at 828. 
447 See id .. at 838. 
448 See id. at 837. 
449 See, e.g., Jerry Jackson & Lyle D. Albaugh, A Critique of the Takings Executive Order 
in the Context of Environmental Regulations, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. at 10,468 (Nov. 1988); see 
also McElfish, supra note 252, at 10,475-76. 
450 See, e.g., Jackson & Albaugh, supra note 449, at 10,468; see also McElfish, supra note 
252, at 10,475-76. 
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C. Current Developments in Takings Jurisprudence 
The most significant changes made to takings law after 1988 came 
in the recent case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 451 Jus-
tice Scalia, writing for the majority, abolished the Agins balancing 
test for certain situations.452 The Court created, for the first time, a 
categorical rule that any time the government deprives an owner of 
all economically beneficial use of his or her land, this act amounts to 
a taking regardless of the public purpose the restriction serves.453 
In creating a categorical rule, the Lucas Court eliminated the nuis-
ance exception as previously understood and replaced it with a very 
narrow exception. 454 If a regulation prohibits property uses that are 
impermissible under common law nuisance and property principles, 
then the regulation does not take the property even if the regulation 
denies the owner all economically beneficial use. 455 
Mr. Lucas, a residential developer, claimed that he was denied all 
economically feasible use of his beachfront property when a regula-
tion passed two years after he purchased the property prohibited 
him from erecting any "permanent habitable structures"456 on the 
property. Mr. Lucas owned two parcels of land and each was subject 
to the restrictions of this regulation, the Beachfront Management 
Act.457 The most profitable use for these properties would be to build 
luxury homes on the land, but the Beachfront Management Act 
denied him this use. 458 The trial court found that the building re-
strictions rendered the land "valueless" and the Supreme Court 
accepted this as true. 
Despite its pronouncements, the Lucas Court left several areas of 
takings law untouched. Two of them are relevant to this analysis as 
it relates to President Reagan's Taking Order. First, Lucas's cate-
451 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). 
452 112 S.Ct. at 2899. Agins required courts to weigh the private harm against the public's 
interest in the land use restriction. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980). 
453 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2899. The Court's pronounce-
ment applies only to real, and not to personal, property. See id. at 2899-2900. 
454 See id. at 2900-0l. 
455 See id. The Court's analysis in reaching this new test is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
Briefly, however, the Court stated that property uses that the common law or property 
principles forbid are not part of an owner's title to the land and, thus, when the government 
proscribes these uses, it is not taking anything that belongs to the owner. See id. 
456 See id. 
457 Beachfront Management Act, S.C. Code § 48-39-250 et. seq. (Supp. 1990). 
458 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 112 S.Ct. at 2908 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). 
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gorical rule applies only when the owner is denied all economically 
beneficial use of his or her property.459 Such a deprivation, the Court 
stated, is "relatively rare."460 In situations where the restriction 
denies the owner less than all economically beneficial use of the 
property, the Agins balancing test would seem to apply still.461 In 
fact, the Court stated a regulation that denies an owner ninety 
percent of the property's economically beneficial use and does not 
compensate the owner for that loss may still be constitutional. 462 It 
was interesting, therefore, that the Court accepted as true the lower 
court's ruling that the Beachfront Management Act denied Mr. Lucas 
all economically beneficial use of his property, even though the reg-
ulation only eliminated the most profitable use of the land. 463 
Second, the Lucas Court left open the question of whether to look 
at the parcel as a whole or to look only at the affected portions of 
the property when examining the regulation's adverse economic im-
pact on the property owner.464 Because the Beachfront Management 
Act affected both parcels of land, the Court had no reason to examine 
this issue, but, nevertheless, mentioned it in dicta. 465 In a footnote, 
the Court stated that the rule-that the Court should examine the 
diminution in value of the property as a whole-was "extreme-and 
... unsupportable .... "466 The Court suggested, again in a footnote, 
that if state law affords legal recognition to the adversely affected 
property interest, the owner's reasonable expectations in that inter-
est might warrant limiting the Court's examination to the affected 
interest and not to the parcel as a whole. 467 
The cases discussed above contain the principles upon which tak-
ings jurisprudence, as it exists now and as it existed in 1988, rests. 468 
While Lucas changed takings law to some degree, many of the 
takings principles remain unchanged from 1988.469 Next, this Com-
ment will discuss the extent to which the Takings Order reflected 
459 [d. at 2894. 
460 [d. The Court accepted as true the trial court's determination that the regulation did 
deny the owner all economically beneficial use. See id. 
461 See id. 
462 See id. 
463 [d. at 2890. In Andrus v. Allard, however, the Court held that elimination of the 
property's most profitable use by the government did not necessarily constitute a taking. See 
444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
464 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992). 
465 See id. 
466 See id. 
467 See id. 
468 See supra notes 303-467 and accompanying text. 
469 See supra notes 459-67 and accompanying text. 
1993] EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,630 687 
takings law as it existed in 1988 and the extent to which it reflects 
current takings law. 
V. THE TAKINGS ORDER WAS DESIGNED As A TOOL To 
FURTHER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DEREGULATION SCHEME 
President Reagan attempted to exercise an unprecedented degree 
of control over federal agency decisionmaking. 470 He implemented a 
comprehensive program to achieve that control, including staffing 
the agencies with administrators who were both responsive to his 
deregulation agenda and hostile to the objectives of their individual 
agencies. 471 In addition, President Reagan created a bureaucratic 
review system to scrutinize, influence, and even prevent the prom-
ulgation of new regulations. 472 
When viewed in the context of President Reagan's entire dere-
gulation program, it is clear that the Takings Order was an effort to 
extend presidential control over executive agency decisionmaking in 
two ways. First, the Order explicitly restricts an agency's ability to 
promulgate certain types of regulations, including those designed to 
protect public health and safety.473 Second, the Order adds weight 
to the cost-side of OMB's cost-benefit review of proposed regulations 
that have takings implications. 474 This allows an opportunity for OMB 
to prevent agencies from implementing any regulations with takings 
implications because they will be too costly under Executive Order 
12,291. If the Takings Order remains effective, or if it is codified 
into law by the Private Property Rights Act of 1993, the result will 
be a perpetuation of President Reagan's scheme to deactivate the 
regulatory agencies. 
A. The Takings Order I s Not Supported By Takings Law 
The Takings Order is falsely premised on concern for the public 
fisc. 475 For the three year period before the Takings Order was 
issued, no successful takings claims were brought against federal 
regulations promulgated by executive agencies.476 The Order signif-
470 See supra notes 11-14 and 47-50 and accompanying text. 
471 See supra notes 65-87 and accompanying text. 
472 See supra notes 96-210 and accompanying text. 
473 See supra notes 233-64 and accompanying text. 
474 See infra notes 557-75 and accompanying text. 
475 See supra notes 185-469 and accompanying text. 
476 See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text. 
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icantly overstates the status of takings law as it existed in 1988,477 
and even as it exists today,478 meaning that the threat posed by the 
Just Compensation Clause to the public fisc does not exist to the 
extent proposed by the Reagan Administration. Areas of the Takings 
Order that are particularly troublesome include the Order's direc-
tives regarding the legitimacy of the government's purpose for act-
ing,479 the economic impact that property owners must suffer,480 the 
degree of impact on each property interest making up the owner's 
bundle of rights,481 reciprocity of advantage,482 health and safety 
regulations,483 undue delays,484 and permit conditions. 485 
The Guidelines direct agencies to examine the purpose behind 
their actions very carefully.486 The Guidelines go so far as to require 
an agency to investigate the congressional intent behind the agen-
cies' enabling statute's legislative history to determine whether a 
legitimate purpose for acting exists and whether the action will serve 
that purpose. 487 It is unlikely that a court hearing a takings case 
would examine a statute's purpose so closely. First, under 1988 
takings law no judicial standards existed for determining what con-
stituted a legitimate public purpose. 488 Instead, courts gave great 
deference to legislative declaration of what constituted both a public 
threat and a legitimate response to that threat. 489 Even today, it is 
unlikely that a court would scrutinize a governmental purpose as 
strictly as the Takings Order requires. While the Court in Lucas v. 
California Coastal Commission490 restricted the scope of the nuis-
ance exception, it did not abrogate the legislature's authority to 
declare a public threat to be a'legitimate public interest. 491 
477 See supra notes 303-450 and accompanying text. 
478 See supra notes 450-68 and accompanying text. 
479 See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text. 
480 See supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text. 
481 See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 
482 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
483 See supra notes 236-51 and accompanying text. 
484 See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text. 
485 See supra notes 252-59 and accompanying text. 
486 Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated 
Takings, supra note 15, at § V(D)(2)(a). The agency should look both to legislative history 
and the operative language of the statute to determine legislative intent. See id. 
487 See id. at § V(D)(2)(a)(i). 
488 See supra notes 312-22 and accompanying text. 
489 See supra notes 312-15 and accompanying text. 
490 See 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). 
491 See id. 
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In addition to examining the action's purpose, the Takings Order 
limits the scope of an agency's action, relative to the public purpose 
the action is meant to address. 492 The agency's response to a harm 
must be specifically tailored to counter, but not exceed, the degree 
to which the property use will contribute to the harm.493 Takings 
jurisprudence does not require that a regulation be specifically tai-
lored. 494 In fact, the Supreme Court stated in 1987 "[t]hat a land use 
regulation may be somewhat overinclusive or underinclusive is, of 
course, no justification for rejecting it."495 
Next the Takings Order requires an extensive inquiry into the 
action's economic impact on the property owner. 496 This requirement 
has two major faults. First, the Guidelines instruct the agencies to 
consider the economic impact on each discrete property interest, 
rather than looking at the diminution in value of the property as a 
whole. 497 Second, the Order mandates that agencies consider eco-
nomic impact,498 but under takings law, if the government's action 
falls within the nuisance exception, economic impact need not always 
be considered. 499 
The Guidelines explicitly state that agencies should not consider 
the action's affect on the property as a whole but, rather, should 
break the property down into many separate and discrete economic 
and property interests. 50o The agencies should look separately at the 
degree of economic impact on each property interest recognized by 
law. 501 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,502 the 
Court examined whether it should define the affected property in-
terest as one entire package or as many discrete bundles. 503 Although 
Justice Rehnquist disagreed sharply,504 the majority held that the 
492 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). 
493 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(b). 
494 See supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
495 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 487 n.16 (1987); see 
also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926). 
496 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(D)(2)(b). 
497 See id. at § V(D)(2)(b)(i) & (ii). 
498 See id. at § V(D)(2)(b). 
499 See supra notes 360-70 and accompanying text. 
500 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(D)(2)(b)(i) & (ii). 
501 See id. 
502 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
503 See id. at 497. 
504 See supra notes 388-94 and accompanying text. 
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Court should consider the action's economic impact on the property 
as a whole and not its impact on the separate property interests that 
make up the whole.505 Thus, a court in 1988 probably would have 
followed the rule laid out in Keystone Bituminous and not the rule 
that the Takings Order articulates. Even today, under Lucas, a court 
may follow the Keystone Bituminous rule. While Lucas suggested 
that the proper inquiry is the effect on each individual property 
interest, it only did so in dictum. 506 The separate and discrete prop-
erty interests rule, as stated in the Takings Order, is far more 
encompassing than the rule the courts actually employ. This Takings 
Order directive is likely to result in a finding that many actions, 
which a court would not hold to constitute a taking, have takings 
implications, nevertheless. 
The Takings Order's directive regarding economic impact is faulty 
in a second way. The Order requires an analysis of economic impacts 
for all regulations subject to review under the Order, regardless of 
the public purpose behind the government's actions. 507 Under both 
1988 and current takings law, the economic impact is not always 
relevant. 508 Both in 1988 and today, if the regulation falls within the 
scope of the nuisance exception, the government need not compen-
sate the owner, regardless of the degree of economic harm.509 In 
1988, the nuisance exception was very broad.510 The exception en-
compassed legislation deSIgned to eradicate dangers to the public 
health, safety, and welfare. 511 Courts gave a great amount of defer-
ence to governmental actions taken in response to these dangers. 512 
Although Justice Rehnquist insisted that the "nuisance exception 
... is not coterminous with the police powers,"513 five years later 
Justice Scalia assured us that in 1987 it was abundantly clear that 
the nuisance exception did extend to the full scope of the police 
powers. 514 Today, the nuisance exception is far more limited, ex-
tending only to common law nuisances. 515 Regardless of how the 
505 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). 
506 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992). 
507 See generally Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance 
of Unanticipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(D)(2)(b). 
508 See supra notes 361-67 and accompanying text. 
509 See supra notes 361-67 and 455 and accompanying text. 
510 See supra notes 361-71 and accompanying text. 
511 See supra notes 361-71 and accompanying text. 
512 See supra notes 313-15 and accompanying text. 
513 Penn Centro Transp. CO. V. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
514 See Lucas V. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992). 
515 See supra note 455 and accompanying text. 
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nuisance exception is defined, when a governmental action falls 
within the scope of that exception, the economic harm to the prop-
erty owner is not a factor relevant to a court's determination of the 
constitutionality of that action. 516 
When assessing economic harm, the Order permits the agency to 
consider whether any benefits flowing from the action might offset 
or mitigate the owner?s economic damage. 517 This may be a reference 
to the Court's use of the reciprocity of advantage doctrine. 518 If so, 
it is misguided. The reciprocity of advantage doctrine was a recog-
nition that the regulatory burden was being spread out amongst 
many, and not heaped onto one individual. 519 The benefits flowing to 
those whose property uses were restricted by the action were not 
necessarily economic, but included nonquantifiable health, safety, 
and welfare benefits. 520 If one property owner felt slighted because 
he or she could not use the land in a potentially harmful way, he or 
she at least benefited by similar restrictions on a neighbor's land. 521 
The Takings Order warns that undue delays in decisionmaking 
could amount to a taking. 522 Additionally, if the decisionmaking pro-
cess "interferes with the use of private property pending the deci-
sion," the compensation award could increase. 523 In light of these 
assertions, the Takings Order states that the time allowed for deci-
sionmaking shall be kept to a minimum. 524 These assertions are 
contrary to takings law. 
In First English Evangelical, the Court acknowledged that the 
government was responsible for compensating landowners whenever 
it took private property, even if it did so only temporarily.525 The 
Court stressed, however, that its holding was limited to situations 
where the government denied the owner all use of his or her prop-
erty.526 This is a far cry from the "interference" with property use 
516 See supra notes 361 and 455 and accompanying text. 
517 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(D)(2)(b)(iv). 
518 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987). 
519 See supra notes 372-75 and accompanying text. 
520 See supra notes 372-75 and accompanying text. 
521 See supra notes 372-75 and accompanying text. 
522 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(C)(3). 
523 Id. 
524 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(c). 
525 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
526 See id. at 322. 
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suggested by the Takings Order. 527 The Court's holding did not 
extend to interferences with property owners' ability to use their 
land caused by delays in decisionmaking.528 Earlier cases addressed 
delays in decisionmaking. In 1980, the Court advised that delays in 
governmental decisionmaking, even if those delays restrict an own-
er's ability to build upon or sell property during pendency of the 
decision, generally do not amount to a taking. 529 The Court in Agins 
v. City of Tiburon530 pointed out that an owner, restricted by such 
an action, would be free to develop or sell the property once the 
governmental decisionmaking process was over and, thus, the re-
striction did not amount to a taking. 531 
The Takings Order prohibits, to the extent permitted by law, an 
agency from placing conditions on land-use permits unless those 
conditions substantially advance the same purpose that the permit-
ting program itself serves. 532 The Supreme Court addressed permit 
conditions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 533 The Nol-
lan Court required that there be a nexus between the permit's 
condition and the public purpose justifying the permitting pro-
gram. 534 The Court's requirement that the condition serve the same 
purpose as the permitting program was dictum. 535 Yet, the Takings 
Order based its mandate on this dictum. 536 Additionally, the Takings 
Order requires that the condition substantially advance the permit-
ting program's purpose. 537 The Nollan Court, however, did not ar-
ticulate how substantial the nexus must be, it only stated that any 
nexus that might have existed between the taking of a public ease-
ment across the Nollan's beach and the ability to see the ocean from 
the street was not sufficient to meet the requirement. 538 The Order's 
misstatement of takings law is significant because the Takings Order 
does not" merely advise agencies how to evaluate their permit con-
ditions for takings implications but, rather, restricts an agency's 
527 See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text. 
528 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. at 321. 
529 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980). 
530 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
531 See id. 
532 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(a). 
533 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
534 See id. at 839. 
535 See supra notes 449-50 and accompanying text. 
536 See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text. 
537 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(a). 
538 See NaHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
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ability to implement permit conditions, altogether.539 Many environ-
mental regulations use permitting programs and some of these pro-
grams involve multiple permitting conditions.540 Thus, if agencies 
are forced to comply with the Takings Order, as they will be if the 
Private Property Rights Act of 1993 is enacted, agencies may be 
prohibited from using many of the permitting programs that they 
now use to achieve their goals. 
The Takings Order demands the most exacting review when agen-
cies act for health and safety purposes,541 even though courts typi-
cally give more deference to health, safety, and welfare regulations 
than to regulations promUlgated for other purposes. 542 When regu-
lating for health and safety purposes, the Guidelines require that 
agencies be able to establish, and support by meaningful evidence, 
that a clearly identified health or safety risk is both "real and sub-
stantial. "543 Next, the Order imposes a certainty requirement on the 
agency's assertion that the particular property-use it wishes to reg-
ulate actually will contribute to the health or safety risk if the agency 
does not act to prevent that harm.544 Additionally, the agency must 
estimate the severity of injury to the public if the property use goes 
unregulated.545 
In 1988, a regulation promulgated for health and safety purposes 
would have received a great deal of deference from the courts. 546 
While courts inquired into the veracity of an asserted purpose, they 
generally left the legislature to determine what does and does not 
constitute a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare and to 
determine how best to eradicate those threats.547 In light of the law, 
as it existed in 1988, there was no basis for the Takings Order's 
requirements that the agency identify so explicitly the nature of the 
harm it intends to correct. Today, even if we assume that Lucas 
removed health and safety regulations from the nuisance exception 
completely, the Takings Order's restrictions are unfounded. A court 
would engage in the balancing test, articulated in Agins v. City of 
539 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(a). 
540 McElfish, supra note 252, at 10,476. 
541 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 10, at § 4(d). 
542 See supra notes 312-22 and accompanying text. 
543 See Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanti-
cipated Takings, supra note 15, at § V(C)(2)(a). 
544 See id. at § V(C)(2)(c)(i). 
545 See id. at § V(C)(2)(c)(ii). 
546 See supra notes 312-22 and accompanying text. 
547 See supra notes 312-22 and accompanying text. 
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Tiburon,548 which weighs the public interest against the private 
economic harm.549 The standard of judicial scrutiny of the legitimate 
public purpose, under the Agins test, is much lower than the scrutiny 
of the public purpose demanded by the Takings Order.550 The Takings 
Order requires that the harm addressed by the agency action be 
specifically identified,551 while the Agins test only requires that the 
harm be deemed a public harm by the government. 552 
Two commentators point out the fallacy of the "real and substan-
tial" requirement. 553 The real and substantial requirement does not 
exist in takings law.554 While courts require that a regulation sub-
stantially advance a legitimate public purpose, they have never 
stated that the legitimate public purpose itself, must be substan-
tial. 555 Instead, "substantial" qualifies the degree to which the action 
eradicates the harm; the term does not qualify the extent of the 
harm itself. 556 
When analyzing a proposed regulation under the criteria that the 
Guidelines provide, it is clear that many more regulations would 
have "takings implications" than actually would have been found to 
constitute a taking by a court in 1988. By broadly overstating the 
principles of takings jurisprudence, President Reagan reached sig-
nificantly more proposed regulations than he would have if the Tak-
ings Order had stated takings law principles accurately. 
B. The Connection Between the Takings Order and Executive 
Order 12,291 
Executive Order 12,291 restricts an agency's ability to implement 
regulations by requiring that the agency choose the least costly 
alternative and that the agency implement a program only if the 
program's benefits to society outweigh its costS.557 By weighing the 
benefits of each program against each program's respective costs, 
the agency can determine which program is the least costly.558 The 
548 447 u.s. 255 (1980). 
649 See id. at 262. 
550 See supra notes 241-49 and 306-15 and accompanying text. 
651 See supra notes 241-47 and accompanying text. 
652 See supra notes 306-15 and accompanying text. 
653 See Jackson & Albaugh, supra note 449, at 10,465. 
564 See id. 
565 See id. 
556 See id. 
657 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 12, at § 2(b) & (d). 
668 See id. at § 2(b). 
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Takings Order works on the premise that if a proposed action has 
takings implications, it may be ruled to be a compensable taking, 
which would cost the government money.559 We have already seen 
that this often is unlikely.560 Nevertheless, by requiring agencies to 
estimate the potential cost to the government for each program with 
takings implications, and to submit those estimations to OMB,561 the 
Takings Order increases the likelihood that the potential cost may 
render the action too costly to implement.562 The cost-estimation 
adds weight to the cost-side of the Executive Order 12,291 cost-
benefit analysis. Thus, the Takings Order can be used as a tool to 
perpetuate the coercive powers of OMB over executive agency de-
cisionmaking. 
By passing the Private Property Rights Act (the Act),563 a bill 
proposed to codify the Takings Order into public law, Congress would 
ensure the perpetuation of these coercive and disruptive powers. 564 
Even if OMB were to forego review or to cooperate with the imple-
mentation of social and environmental regulation, the Act creates a 
procedural cause of action against agencies that may impede prom-
ulgation of future regulations.565 A potential situation could play out 
as follows. An agency implements a proposed regulation that OMB, 
for one reason or another, approves. Unfortunately, the agency was 
not in full compliance with the Takings Order. Pursuant to the Act, 
an aggrieved property owner brings suit, and her judicial action 
forces the agency to review the action under the Takings Order. 566 
Not surprisingly, the agency determines that, although the action 
would not constitute a compensable taking under current takings 
jurisprudence, the action does have "takings implications," as they 
are defined in the Takings Order. 567 The agency must now pretend 
that a court may one day rule that the action does, indeed, constitute 
a taking, and estimate what that ruling, and others like it, might 
cost the government. 568 Furthermore, the agency must inform OMB 
569 See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text. 
560 See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text. 
561 Estimations of cost need be submitted to OMB only upon OMB's request. See Attorney 
General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings, 
supra note 15, at § VI(B)(I). 
562 See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
563 S. 177, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
564 See supra notes 296--300 and accompanying text. 
566 See supra notes 270-90 and accompanying text. 
566 See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
567 See supra notes 206-469 and accompanying text. 
566 See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
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of these potential costs, at OMB's request. 569 When these costs are 
calculated into the Executive Order 12,291 cost-benefit analysis, 
suddenly, and not surprisingly, the action is quite costly; perhaps 
too costly to implement. 570 
C. The Takings Order Is An Impermissible Exercise Of Executive 
Control Over The Agencies 
It is clear, under current law, that the President cannot prevent 
agencies from failing to comply with Congress's nondiscretionary 
directives. 571 Several courts have ruled that OMB's interference with 
EPA's completion of nondiscretionary duties, through the Executive 
Order 12,291 cost-benefit review, was an impermissible exercise of 
executive control over the EPA.572 The Takings Order amounts to 
the same thing. 
The Takings Order is a vehicle for coercing agencies-and partic-
ularly agencies whose actions affect property uses, such as EP A-
into not regulating or regulating less. The Takings Order does this 
in two ways. First, it limits an agency's ability to promulgate health 
and safety regulations573 and to use permit conditions. 574 In addition, 
the Takings Order limits the amount of time that an agency may 
take when acting575 and it limits the scope of the agency's action 
relative to the public purpose the action is meant to address. 576 
Second, the Takings Order coerces agencies into not regulating in 
ways that affect the use or value of private property by feeding into 
the Executive Order 12,291 cost-benefit review. By overstating the 
types of actions that will amount to a taking, the Takings Order 
assigns a cost to any regulation that has takings implications. 577 This 
cost can then be added to the cost-side of the cost-benefit review. 
Because agencies are prohibited from implementing programs when 
the costs outweigh the benefits, agencies may be prohibited from 
implementing actions that have takings implications because they 
are too costly.578 By giving the Director of OMB authority to oversee 
569 See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text. 
570 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
571 See supra notes 126-48 and accompanying text. 
572 See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text. 
573 See supra notes 240-49 and accompanying text. 
574 See supra notes 246-59 and accompanying text. 
575 See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text. 
576 See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text. 
577 See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
518 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. 
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compliance with the Takings Order,579 President Reagan ensured 
that the costs created by the Takings Order would be considered in 
OMB's review of the Executive Order 12,291 cost-benefit analysis 
for each proposed regulation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Executive Orders 12,630 and 12,291 are a dangerous pair. Alone, 
each may be benign, but together, with one feeding off of the other, 
they create a situation that can prevent agencies from successfully 
regulating public and environmental threats. President Reagan cre-
ated this machine when he fictionalized the Just Compensation 
Clause's threat to the public purse. The Clinton Administration can 
stop the machine by repealing Executive Order 12,630. Repealing 
the Takings Order, however, will not be enough. Congress must 
reject the Private Property Rights Act and completely eliminate the 
deregulation machine's self-perpetuating nature. 
579 See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text. 
